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Hoflander: A Red Bull Instead of a Cigarette: Should the FDA Regulate Energy

A RED BULL INSTEAD OF A CIGARETTE:
SHOULD THE FDA REGULATE ENERGY
DRINKS?
I. INTRODUCTION
Law is merely the expression of the will of the strongest for the
time being, and therefore laws have no fixity, but shift from
generation to generation.
—Henry Brooks Adams1
When a new American generation is born, innovation ensues; but, as
progress advances, obstacles arise.2 How the public handles these
setbacks differentiates the United States from other nations.3 Morals,
values, and beliefs transform with each new generation, and the
American legal system adapts.4
To illustrate this principle, compare the sentiment Americans
expressed toward tobacco usage during the World War I and World War
II eras to the modern sentiment.5 Plainly stated, tobacco is no longer
fashionable or sexy.6 Scientific evidence relating to the adverse health
effects of tobacco usage and expensive anti-tobacco advertising
campaigns largely account for the decline in tobacco use.7 Also, with the
recent enactment of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco

THE NEW LAWYER’S WIT AND WISDOM: QUOTATIONS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION, IN
BRIEF 256 (Bruce Nash & Allan Zullo eds., 2001).
2
See generally ERIC H. GREENBERG & KARL WEBER, GENERATION WE: HOW MILLENNIAL
YOUTH ARE TAKING OVER AMERICA AND CHANGING OUR WORLD FOREVER 12–14 (2008)
(discussing how the Millennial (We) Generation—individuals born between 1978 and
2000—is emerging as a powerful political and social force).
3
Id. at 12. According to Greenberg, “[g]reat leaders play an important role in shaping
history. But an even greater role is played by the generations of ordinary people from
whom the great leaders arise. Without those millions of people, sharing a common vision
and ready to shape the future together, even great leaders can accomplish little.” Id.
4
Id. at 9. Regarding the greatness of American culture, Greenberg writes, “I have faith
that with open, informed debate, Americans can use the system we inherited from the
Founders to make the wisest long-term choices and get our country back on the track
toward peace, prosperity, and freedom.” Id.
5
See MICHAEL RABINOFF, ENDING THE TOBACCO HOLOCAUST: HOW BIG TOBACCO
AFFECTS OUR HEALTH, POCKETBOOK, AND POLITICAL FREEDOM—AND WHAT WE CAN DO
ABOUT IT 74 (Barbara McNichol ed., 2006) (“Partly as a result of cigarette rationing in World
War I and World War II, 47 percent of adult Americans were smokers by 1950.”).
6
See id. at 97 (providing the text of a statement by former U.S. Secretary of Department
of Health and Human Services Donna E. Shalala regarding the trendiness of cigarettes).
7
See infra Part II.C (discussing the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control
Act).
1
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Control Act (“FSPTCA”), tobacco use may diminish further.8
Consequently, the question arises, what new alluring product is seizing
tobacco’s position? The answer is energy drinks.9
Consumers throughout the world purchase millions of energy drinks
daily, and indisputably, United States citizens lead in consumption of
those beverages.10 This result is advantageous for domestic beverage
manufacturers, but what about those who consume the beverages?
Results of scientific studies vary, but recent research evidences that
energy drinks can cause adverse health effects and even death to the
unknowing consumer.11 Some argue regulation of this industry is
excessive, while others contend that regulation is necessary to limit
caffeine content and inform the public of consumption risks.12
Regardless, findings prompted several foreign nations to regulate energy
drinks and influenced legislators in the United States to introduce bills
with the intention of protecting the public health.13
Currently, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) holds
little authority to regulate energy drinks because the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) categorizes the beverages as dietary
supplements.14 For instance, if the FDA attempts to compel energy drink
manufacturers to limit caffeine content or display new warning
statements on the packaging, the manufacturers could challenge the

See infra Part II.C (discussing the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control
Act and its anticipated effect on the tobacco industry).
9
This Note evaluates the similarities between the pharmacological and therapeutic
effects of tobacco usage and energy drink consumption. These two consumer products
compare readily because both create adverse health effects and attract young consumers.
Tobacco manufacturers historically marketed their products to younger demographics by
presenting the product as trendy or chic, and energy drink manufacturers are utilizing a
similar marketing strategy. For many years, the populace remained unaware of the
negative health consequences caused by tobacco, and currently, many are unaware of the
effects of energy drink consumption. These similarities provide helpful insight as to the
necessity for the increased regulation of energy drinks.
10
See infra notes 48–49 and accompanying text (specifying global and domestic sales
figures of the rapidly expanding energy drink industry).
11
See infra Part III.B (analyzing the efficacy of energy drink ingredients and evaluating
the results of clashing scientific studies).
12
See infra Part III.B (discussing the competing viewpoints as to whether regulation is
prudent).
13
See infra notes 102–12 and accompanying text (describing the efforts of several United
States legislators to regulate energy drinks as well as the successful and unsuccessful
attempts by multiple foreign nations to regulate heavily caffeinated beverages).
14
See infra notes 54–61 and accompanying text (explaining why a manufacturer’s
marketing claims determine whether a product, such as an energy drink, is classified as a
dietary supplement).
8

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/7

Hoflander: A Red Bull Instead of a Cigarette: Should the FDA Regulate Energy

2011]

Regulating Energy Drinks

691

directive and would likely succeed.15
Without a congressional
amendment to the FDCA, the FDA’s regulatory authority regarding
energy drinks may remain minimal.16
First, this Note provides a history of the FDA and a discussion of its
congressional mandate to protect the public health and safety.17 In
addition, Part II discusses the rapidly expanding energy drink industry
and presents a foundation for dietary supplement regulation modeled
after provisions of the FSPTCA.18 Part III analyzes the regulation of
energy drinks, including pharmacological elements, economic theory,
FDA jurisdiction concerns, and discord relating to the FDA’s potential
lack of resources.19 Part IV proposes amendments to the FDCA that will
enable the FDA to regulate energy drinks.20 More specifically, the first
proposed amendment provides a statutory definition of an energy drink,
and the second proposed amendment clearly grants the FDA the
requisite power to regulate the manufacturing, marketing, and
distribution of energy drinks.21
II. BACKGROUND
Heavily caffeinated energy drinks have addictive qualities similar to
the nicotine found in cigarettes.22 This reality is creating speculation as
to whether Big Energy Beverage is the new Big Tobacco and should thus
be regulated similarly.23 Part II discusses the FDA’s mandate to regulate
the manufacturing, marketing, and labeling of certain consumer
products as well as a scientific and economic assessment of the rapidly
expanding energy drink market.24 Through enabling statutes, such as
the FDCA, Congress afforded the FDA increased authority to protect the

15
See infra notes 70–72 and accompanying text (discussing circumstances where the FDA
exceeded its statutory grant of authority).
16
See infra Part IV (proposing amendments to the FDCA that enable the FDA to regulate
the manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of energy drinks).
17
See infra Part II (discussing the statutory creation of the FDA and its growing
authority).
18
See infra Part II.B–C (discussing the global energy drink market and the FSPTCA).
19
See infra Part III (providing a comprehensive analysis of several elements that will
influence the FDA’s ability to regulate energy drinks).
20
See infra Part IV (proposing statutory amendments to the FDCA).
21
See infra Part IV (proposing statutory amendments to the FDCA).
22
See infra Part III.B (detailing the addictive characteristics of caffeine).
23
See infra Part II.C (providing an overview of tobacco regulation and its potential
applicability to the energy drink industry).
24
See infra Part II (discussing the FDA’s mandate to regulate consumer products, such as
tobacco and dietary supplements).
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public’s health and safety by preventing adulterated, misbranded, or
untested consumer products from reaching the interstate market.25
More specifically, Part II.A discusses the essential legislation and
judicial decisions that are the pillars of the FDA’s mandate.26 Next, Part
II.B offers an economic overview of the energy drink market and an
explanation of why the FDA lacks the requisite power to oversee the
energy drink industry.27 Part II.C outlines the foundation for a
regulatory scheme applicable to energy drinks based on the framework
of the FSPTCA with an overview of the new law’s social and economic
impact in the United States.28 Part II.D examines the regulation of
energy drinks in foreign countries and energy drink regulatory bills
proposed by legislators in the United States.29 Finally, this Part examines
numerous and lengthy acts and amendments through which Congress
progressively broadened the FDA’s authority to regulate in order to keep
Americans safe from dangerous products.30
A. The FDA’s Authority to Regulate Food Products
In 1906, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drugs Act (“Pure Food
Act”), which was the first major piece of legislation making it unlawful
for a person to adulterate or misbrand any drug or food.31 Section 4 of
25
See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121
Stat. 823 (2007); Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108
Stat. 4325 (1994); Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 101, 76 Stat. 780 (1962)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 351 (2006)); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2006)); Pure
Food and Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 62-301, 37 Stat. 416 (1912) (amending the 1906 Act); Pure
Food and Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed by 21 U.S.C. § 329(a));
see also United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 696–97 (1948) (discussing the FDA’s
authority to prohibit misbranded articles to be transported in interstate commerce); United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 278, 285 (1943) (holding that a president of a
corporation may be found guilty for violating the FDCA, independent of the corporation’s
guilt).
26
See infra Part II.A (discussing the creation of the FDA through enabling legislation and
its purpose presented through legislative history).
27
See infra Part II.B (providing an industry analysis and description of the FDA’s power
to regulate dietary supplements and health products).
28
See infra Part II.C (discussing the scope of the Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act and examining the financial and social effects of the Act regarding
private industries and the American populace).
29
See infra Part II.D (providing a description of the regulation of energy drinks in foreign
countries and the movement in America by legislators and academics to regulate the
energy drink industry).
30
See infra Part II.A (discussing the creation of the FDA and expansion of regulatory
authority enabled by multiple statutes passed by Congress).
31
See Pure Food and Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed by 21
U.S.C. § 329(a)) (ensuring that products are labeled correctly and paving the way for the
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the Pure Food Act authorized the Bureau of Chemistry to perform
examinations of the allegedly substandard food or drug article.32 If the
food or drug article was deemed misbranded or adulterated, the Bureau
would first inform the responsible party. After the party had an
opportunity to be heard and if a violation still existed, the Bureau would
notify the proper United States District Attorney of the violation. 33 The
Pure Food Act provided for removal of the misbranded or adulterated
article but failed to include a provision regulating false claims of
effectiveness.34 Although the Pure Food Act was amended in 1912 to
remedy this particular omission of misbranding regulation, a new act
was passed two decades later, fashioning a new agency armed with a
congressional mandate to regulate.35
Congress officially created the FDA in 1938 by passing the FDCA.36
The chief purpose of the FDCA is to forbid “the movement in interstate
formation of the FDA). Congress enacted the Pure Food Act in 1906 “in response to
criticism by the Progressive movement of widespread food and drug impurities [to]
establish[] liability for the manufacture of adulterated or misbranded drugs.” Steven R.
Salbu, Regulation of Drug Treatments for HIV and AIDS: A Contractarian Model of Access, 11
YALE J. ON REG. 401, 406 (1994) (footnotes omitted) (detailing the history of the FDA
approval process).
32
Pure Food and Drugs Act § 4. See Salbu, supra note 31, at 407 (discussing the creation
of the Pure Food and Drugs Act).
33
Pure Food and Drugs Act § 4. See Salbu, supra note 31, at 406–07 (providing a brief
background regarding the Pure Food Act and discussing the primary purpose of why
Congress passed the Pure Food Act.). The Pure Food Act held manufacturers responsible
for the safety (or lack thereof) of their products and it loosely required them to monitor
their products for errors in “strength, quality, and purity,” and to accurately label the
products. Id. at 407.
34
See generally Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Remedies Available for Violations of
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 25 A.L.R. FED. 2D 431 (2008) (providing a
general overview of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). In 1911, in United States v.
Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 498 (1911), the Supreme Court held that although the Pure Food Act
prohibited mislabeling of drug ingredients, it did not forbid other kinds of fraudulent
claims made on product labels. “Moreover, the 1906 Act failed to enumerate standards or
specific methods of pre-market testing that would prevent adulteration, or to provide any
mechanism for centralized regulatory approval of new drugs.” Salbu, supra note 31, at 407
(discussing the primary purposes of why Congress passed the Pure Food Act).
35
Sherley Amendment of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-352, 37 Stat. 416, 416 (1912). The Pure
Food Act of 1912 amended Section 8 of the Pure Food Act of 1906 by adding a third
paragraph, which states: “[i]f its package or label shall bear or contain any statement,
design, or device regarding the curative or therapeutic effect of such article or any of the
ingredients or substances contained therein, which is false and fraudulent.” Id. Congress
passed the Pure Food Act of 1912 following United States v. Johnson, where the Supreme
Court held that the statute does not cover misleading statements on labels. Johnson, 221
U.S. at 498–99.
36
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2006)). The FDCA required that drug
manufacturers provide proof that their products were safe before they could be marketed
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commerce of adulterated and misbranded food, drugs, devices, and
cosmetics.”37 Prior to 1938, the federal government did not require
manufacturers to perform pre-market reviews of their products before
selling them to the public.38 In 1962, however, Congress amended the
FDCA following a thalidomide drug tragedy that generated thousands
of birth defects.39 These amendments require the FDA to ensure that
manufacturers of drugs demonstrate that their products are effective and
safe through “substantial evidence.”40 In addition, the amendments
require the manufacturer to properly label their products and prohibit
the manufacturer from misleading consumers through false statements
contrary to test results.41
In the 1970s, the failure of medical devices and thousands of tort
claims prompted Congress to pass the Medical Device Amendments of
1976 (“MDA”), which imposed heightened government oversight.42 The
to the public. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v.
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 705–06 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (discussing the conception of the FDA).
In his Yale law journal article, Steven Salbu describes drug tragedies and congressional
reaction to those tragedies. Salbu, supra note 31, at 407. For instance,
[i]n 1937, the shortcomings of the 1906 Act were demonstrated by the
tragedy brought on by the use of Elixir Sulfanilamide, marketed by the
drug manufacturer Massengill. While the “elixir” was merely a liquid
version of a drug already available in pill form, the solvent used in the
solution had not been tested for safety. Its toxicity resulted in 107
deaths. Under the 1906 Act, Massengill was fined $26,100 for product
mislabeling.
Id. Most importantly, the FDCA required prospective manufacturers to file applications for
the sale of new drugs with the Secretary of Agriculture, “describing drug components and
composition, methods of production control, and proposed labeling language.” Id. at 408.
37
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2006)); see also supra note 36 (providing a
background of the FDCA).
38
See Buckman, supra note 34 (providing a historical analysis of the FDCA).
39
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 101, 76 Stat. 780, 780–96 (1962)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 351 (2006)). Similar to how the Elixir Sulfanilamide
disaster inspired the 1938 Act, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments (“1962 Amendments”)
resulted from a thalidomide tragedy. Salbu, supra note 31, at 408. German pharmaceutical
manufacturer, Grünenthal, marketed Thalidomide as a sedative for pregnant women. Id. at
408, n.41. Consumption of the drug caused birth defects in thousands of infants. Id. “The
1962 Amendments required more rigorous pre-approval drug testing than was required
under the 1938 Act, instituting a series of clinical testing ‘phases’ that comprise the norm
under current law.” Id. at 408.
40
Drug Amendments of 1962 § 101.
41
Id.
42
Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976); Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315–16 (2008) (describing reasons for enactment of the MDA).
Congress enacted the MDA “[t]o amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to
provide for the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human use, and for
other purposes.” Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 90 Stat. at 539. “A series of high-
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FDA’s regulatory strength continued to grow subsequent to the
enactment of the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994
(“DSHEA”), enforced by the Center for Food Safety and Applied
Nutrition (“CFSAN”).43 Once more, Congress amended the FDCA by
passing the Food and Drug Administration Amendments of 2007, and in
doing so, permitted the FDA the authority to require manufacturers of
previously approved products to adhere to modern FDCA regulation.44
profile medical device failures that caused extensive injuries and loss of life propelled
adoption of the MDA.” Riegel, 552 U.S. at 336 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The most
conspicuous failure was the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device used by approximately 2.2
million women in the United States between 1970 and 1974. Id.; In re N. Dist. of Cal.,
Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 848 (9th Cir. 1982). The Dalkon Shield
was aggressively promoted as a safe and effective form of birth control and was linked to
sixteen deaths and twenty-five miscarriages by mid-1975. H.R. REP. NO. 94-853, at 8 (1976).
By early 1976, “more than 500 lawsuits seeking compensatory and punitive damages
totaling more than $400 million” were filed. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 336. In Riegel, Justice
Ginsburg stated, “[g]iven the publicity attending the Dalkon Shield litigation and
Congress’ awareness of the suits at the time the MDA was under consideration, I find
informative the absence of any sign of a legislative design to preempt state common-law
tort actions.” Id. at 336–37.
43
Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325
(1994); see infra note 57 (providing the statutory requirements for a product to be classified
as a dietary supplement). The DSHEA was designed to afford the FDA procedural
provisions applicable only to dietary supplements. Peter Barton Hutt, FDA Statutory
Authority to Regulate the Safety of Dietary Supplements, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 155, 156 (2005)
[hereinafter Hutt, FDA Statutory Authority to Regulate the Safety of Dietary Supplements]. The
procedural provisions include the following:
[f]irst, DSHEA specifically places the burden of proof in a civil
enforcement action relating to the safety of a dietary supplement on
[the] FDA. . . . Second, the court must decide the issue of adulteration
of a dietary supplement on a de novo basis. . . . Third, [the] FDA must
provide a person an opportunity to present both oral and written
views at least ten days before the agency refers a matter to the
Department of Justice for civil court enforcement.
Id. See About the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CFSAN/default.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) (providing
general information about the CFSAN); CFSAN—What We Do, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CFSAN/WhatWeDo/default.htm (last visited Sept 12, 2010)
(detailing the CFSAN’s statutory obligations); FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, DETAIL OF
FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT (FTE) EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM LEVEL, available at http://www.
fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/UCM15
3892.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2010) (providing a detailed report of FDA employment
figures); FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FY 2010 ALL PURPOSE TABLE—BUDGET
AUTHORITY, available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManuals
Forms/Reports/BudgetReports/UCM153876.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2010) (providing an
itemized FDA budget allocation for 2010).
44
See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121
Stat. 823 (2007) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006)). Congress amended the
FDCA “to revise and extend the user-fee programs for prescription drugs and for medical
devices, to enhance the postmarket authorities of the Food and Drug Administration with
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As a result of these acts and amendments, the FDA has the cumbersome
task of ensuring that food, drug, and cosmetic products are of high
integrity so that consumers can trust the products are safe without
question.45
B. The Rapidly Expanding Energy Drink Industry & the FDA’s Lack of
Regulatory Authority
Energy drinks commonly include additives, such as caffeine,
guarana, taurine, ginseng, ginkgo, and glucuronolactone that are
intended to improve cognitive abilities, mental focus, and muscle
endurance.46 The market for energy drinks in the United States began in

respect to the safety of drugs.” Id. Congress amended the FDCA consequent to “[a] report
from the Institute of Medicine suggest[ing] the FDA has not effectively monitored the
safety of pharmaceuticals subsequent to initial approval for use and recommend[ing]
changes to the process by which the FDA monitors postmarketing-adverse-eventsurveillance.” Leslie Kushner, Note, Incentivizing Postmarketing Pharmaceutical Product
Safety Testing with Extension of Exclusivity Periods, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 519, 520 (2009). See generally INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING
AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC (Alina Baciu, Kathleen Stratton & Sheila P.
Burke eds., 2007).
45
See supra note 36 (explaining the history of the FDCA); see also Peter Barton Hutt,
Recent Developments: The State of Science at the Food and Drug Administration, 60 ADMIN. L.
REV. 431, 434–36 (2008) [hereinafter Hutt, The State of Science] (providing a history of the
FDA and the products it regulates); FDA, FISCAL YEAR 2010 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: INTRODUCTION AND MISSION, available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/UCM153491.pdf
(last visited Sept. 12, 2010) (“FDA affects the lives of every American every day. Each year,
consumers spend nearly $1.5 trillion on FDA-regulated products. This represents twenty
percent of all consumer expenditures.”).
46
See generally Michele Simon & James Mosher, Alcohol, Energy Drinks, and Youth: A
Dangerous Mix, MARIN INST., 2007, available at http://www.marininstitute.org/alcopops/
resources/EnergyDrinkReport.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Simon &
Mosher] (discussing the purpose of an energy drink). Energy drink companies, such as the
industry-leading Red Bull, attribute their product’s stimulant effect to the interaction of
such ingredients. Id. at 9. On its website, Red Bull describes its product as a “functional
beverage with a unique combination of ingredients . . . specially developed for times of
increased mental and physical exertion.” Red Bull Energy Drink, RED BULL USA,
http://www.redbullusa.com/cs/Satellite/en_US/Red-Bull-Home/Products/01124274620
8542 (last visited Sept. 25, 2010). Additionally, Red Bull states that its formula “increases
performance[,] increases concentration and reaction speed[,] improves vigilance[,]
improves the emotional status[, and] stimulates metabolism.” Id. “The term energy drink
refers to a beverage that contains caffeine in combination with other ingredients such as
taurine, guarana, and B vitamins, and that claims to provide its consumers with extra
energy. This term was created by [beverage] companies . . . and is not recognized by the
[FDA] or the [USDA].” Karrie Heneman & Sheri Zidenberg-Cherr, Nutrition and Health Info
Sheet:
Energy Drinks, ANR COMMC’N. SERVS., PUBL’N 8265 (2007), available at
http://ucanr.org/freepubs/docs/8265.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2010). Energy drink
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1997 with the introduction of the Austrian-produced Red Bull.47 From
2002 to 2007, the energy drink market grew by an estimated 440% and

companies commonly make the following effective functional claims regarding the
ingredients of their products:
[C]arnitine: improves endurance, increases fat metabolism; protects
against cardiovascular disease[;]
[G]lucuronlactone: promotes excretion of toxins and protects against
cancer[;]
[G]uarana: increases energy, enhances physical performance and
promotes weight loss[;]
[I]nositol: decreases triglyceride and cholesterol levels, lowering risk
of cardiovascular disease[;]
[P]anax [G]inseng: speeds illness recovery; improves mental, physical
and sexual performance; controls blood glucose and lowers blood
pressure[;]
[S]uper [C]itramax: suppresses appetite, resulting in weight loss[;]
[T]aurine: lowers risk of diabetes, epilepsy, and high blood pressure[;
and]
[Y]ohimbine HCl: improves sexual performance and promotes weight
loss.
Id. at 2. (footnotes omitted) (formatting omitted). Because energy drinks are quite new in
America, there is limited scientific evidence regarding the interaction of ingredients;
however, evidence of efficacy of individual ingredients are as follows:
[C]arnitine: [t]here is no clinical evidence that carnitine use is effective
for increased endurance or weight loss, but it may protect against heart
disease.
[G]lucuronlactone: [s]cientific evidence does not exist to support
claims regarding the efficacy of glucuronolactone.
[G]uarana: [a] major component of guarana is caffeine. Caffeine
consumption has been associated with increased energy, enhancement
of physical performance, and suppressed appetite.
[I]nositol: [s]cientific evidence does not exist to support claims
regarding the efficacy of inositol.
[P]anax [G]inseng: [s]cientific evidence does not exist to support
claims regarding the efficacy of panax ginseng.
[S]uper [C]itramax: [t]here is scientific evidence that use of this
supplement decreases food consumption.
[T]aurine: [c]linical evidence is insufficient to show that taurine is
effective in treating diabetes or epilepsy, but it may lower blood
pressure.
[Y]ohimbine HCl: [a]lthough yohimbine HCl may increase blood flow
to sexual organs, there is no evidence that it increases sexual arousal.
It may be effective at treating erectile dysfunction. Currently no
evidence exists to support the claim that use of this supplement leads
to weight loss.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (formatting omitted). See Caffeine Myths and Facts, WEBMD,
http://www.webmd.com/balance/caffeine-myths-and-facts?page=3 (last visited Sept. 12,
2010) (describing positive and negative effects of energy drink consumption).
47
Simon & Mosher, supra note 46, at 3. Energy drink sales have exploded since the
introduction of Red Bull in 1997. Id. The Center for Science in the Public Interest compiled
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included more than 500 energy drink companies worldwide.48 As a
result of this extremely rapid expansion, annual energy drink sales in the
United States alone totaled a lofty $6.6 billion.49 Additionally, analysts
predict U.S. energy drink sales to top $9 billion by 2011.50 This
accomplishment is likely the result of non-paternalistic regulation,
aggressive advertising, and the promotion of energy drinks as
performance enhancers to a target market of young adults.51 In order to
caffeine content (mg) of food and drug products on its website, and caffeine content of topselling energy drinks are as follows:
Spike Shooter 8.4 oz., 300; Cocaine 8.4 oz., 288; Monster Energy 16 oz.,
160; Full Throttle 16 oz., 144; Rip It, all varieties 8 oz., 100; Enviga 12
oz., 100; Tab Energy 10.5 oz., 95; SoBe No Fear 8 oz., 83; Red Bull 8.3
oz., 80; Red Bull Sugarfree 8.3 oz., 80; Rockstar Energy Drink 8 oz., 80;
SoBe Adrenaline Rush 8.3 oz., 79; Amp 8.4 oz., 74; Glaceau Vitamin
Water Energy Citrus 20 oz., 50; SoBe Essential Energy, Berry or Orange
8 oz., 48.
Caffeine Content of Food & Drugs, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, Sept. 2007, available at
http://www.cspinet.org/new/cafchart.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) (formatting
omitted).
48
JORGE S. OLSON & CARLOS LOPEZ, BUILD YOUR BEVERAGE EMPIRE 27 (Gloria L. Olson
ed., 2009).
49
Id.; see Kevin Mayhood, Jolted by Studies, Researchers Want Caffeine Labels on Energy
Drinks, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/
local_news/stories/2008/09/24/drink_label.ART_ART_09-24-08_A1_UHBDNBA.html
(reporting why researchers want energy drink regulation); Simon & Mosher, supra note 46,
at 3 (providing a synopsis of the energy drink market share); Elizabeth Weise, Petition Calls
for FDA to Regulate Energy Drinks: Critics Want Caffeine Levels Listed, Limited, USA TODAY,
Oct. 22, 2008, at 6D (describing energy drink sales figures). Since 2006, BevNet has
published an annual comprehensive compilation of energy drink brands and market
analysis of the previous year. BEVNET Energy Drink Buyer’s Guide 2007, BEVERAGE
SPECTRUM, available at http://www.bevnet.com/news/2007/04-10-2007-energy_drink_
guide_free.asp. The market share of the top five energy drinks in 2007 are as follows: Red
Bull, 42.6%; Monster, 14.4%; Rockstar, 11.4%; Full Throttle, 6.9%; Sobe No Fear, 5.4%. Id.
The market share of the top five energy drinks in 2008 are as follows: Red Bull, 35.2%;
Monster, 27.3%; Rockstar, 11.1%; Full Throttle, 6.6%; Amp, 5.1%. 2008 Energy Drink Guide,
BEVERAGE SPECTRUM, available at http://www.bevnet.com/news/2008/4-14-2008-EDG.asp.
The market share of the top five energy drinks (currently in 2009) are as follows: Red Bull,
40.1%; Monster, 16.2%; Rockstar, 11.0%; Amp, 4.0%; Monster Java, 2.6%. 2009 Energy Drink
Guide, BEVERAGE SPECTRUM, available at http://www.bevnet.com/news/2009/4-13-2009free-energy-drink-guide. The 2009 analysis separates market share percentage by each
individual variety and flavor of energy drink, not just the brand name as the 2006 and 2007
analyses provide.
50
OLSON & LOPEZ, supra note 48, at 27.
51
See Weise, supra note 49, at 6D (“The drinks are advertised as able to increase
endurance, reaction time and concentration, with names such as Full Throttle, Amp Energy
and No Fear.”). But cf. TEVFIK F. NAS, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: THEORY AND APPLICATION
1–2 (Diane S. Foster ed., 1996) (discussing cost-benefit analyses consumers perform every
day); THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY REFORMS FOR THE AGE
OF GOVERNANCE 36 (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur eds., 2004) (inferring that consumers
are competent in their assessment of a product and whether to purchase it); STEVEN D.
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reach this target audience, energy drink companies commonly market
their products at the grassroots level to form one-on-one relationships
with the consumer.52 Energy drink companies market and sell these
drinks as dietary supplements, not as soft drinks such as Coca-Cola or
Pepsi.53

SODERLIND, CONSUMER ECONOMICS: A PRACTICAL OVERVIEW 245 (2001) (providing an
economic and marketing perspective to government regulation); Gerald Dworkin,
Paternalism, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2006),
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2010)
(defining paternalistic regulation); Edward L. Glaeser, Homo Economicus, Homo Myopicus,
and the Law and Economics of Consumer Choice: Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
133, 133 (2006) (providing an overview of regulation theory); Christine Jolls & Cass R.
Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 200–01 (2006) (discussing the
varying degrees of paternalistic regulation); Michael A. McCann, Economic Efficiency and
Consumer Choice Theory in Nutritional Labeling, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1161, 1175–78 (2004)
(explaining the consumer choice theory in terms of food purchases); Mario J. Rizzo &
Douglas Glen Whitman, Little Brother is Watching You: New Paternalism on the Slippery
Slopes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 685, 689–91 (2009) (presenting policy arguments regarding why
consumers are affected by government regulation); Theory of Consumer Choice, BASIC
ECONOMICS, http://www.basiceconomics.info/theory-of-consumer-choice.php (last visited
Sept, 12, 2010) (explaining that consumers combine budget constraints and preferences
when choosing certain products).
52
See Simon & Mosher, supra note 46, at 4 (describing energy drink advertising and
marketing strategies); Weise, supra note 49 (providing examples of advertising claims).
These relationships are “gained through events, extreme sports sponsorships, [and]
Internet interactions . . . . For example, the Monster brand’s ‘ambassadors’ give away free
samples at sporting events, concerts, and other teen venues. Red Bull owns teams such as
the New York Red Bulls soccer team and plans to start its own NASCAR team.” Simon &
Mosher, supra note 46, at 4. Other energy drink manufacturers, such as Full Throttle, Amp
Energy, and Cocaine target their products to young males and “promote the psychoactive,
performance-enhancing, and stimulant effects of energy drinks and appear to glorify drug
use.” Chad J. Reissig et al., Caffeinated Energy Drinks—A Growing Problem, DRUG ALCOHOL
DEPENDENCE (2008), available at http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/bin/w/y/Griffiths.pdf.
Even more extreme is the energy drink “Blow,” which is “packaged in glass vials and
shipped with a mirror and plastic credit cards in an apparent attempt to model cocaine
use.” Id. “Recently, the FDA claimed jurisdiction over both ‘Cocaine’ and ‘Blow,’
informing the companies that their products were marketed as an alternative to an illicit
street drug, not a dietary supplement, and subject to regulation as a drug.” Id. (citations
omitted).
53
Kelly Brewington, High-Energy Drink Jitters: Hopkins Researchers Report on Possible
Caffeine Risks, BALT. SUN, Sept. 24, 2008, at 1A. According to Senior Staff Attorney Ilene
Heller, “[i]f a caffeinated energy drink is marketed as [conventional] food, it would come
under food additive regulations and thus have to adhere to FDA’s caffeine limit in soda.”
Study Urges FDA to Step Up Oversight of Caffeine in Supplements, 14 FDA WEEK 39, 39 (Sept.
26, 2008) (providing proponents’ argument for FDA energy drink regulation). The FDA
has set a caffeine content limit on soft drinks at sixty-eight milligrams for twelve fluid
ounces. See Michele Morgan Bolton, Some Schools Put the Lid on High-Caffeine Beverages: Say
Energy Drinks Pose Health Risk Packed With Caffeine, BOS. GLOBE, July 25, 2009, at 1
(providing data regarding caffeine content of soft drinks and energy drinks).
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Current governing statutes afford the FDA little authority to regulate
energy drinks because the FDCA treats energy drinks as dietary
supplements.54 The FDA classifies food products as either dietary
supplements or conventional foods based on the manufacturer’s
representations and marketing claims.55 Strangely, however, food
products are classified not by their ingredients, composition, safety, or
nutritional value, but rather by the producer’s marketing claims.56 The
Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act thus effectively
constrains the FDA’s power to regulate by creating a subcategory of
food—dietary supplements.57 If a manufacturer markets its product as a
dietary supplement, the DSHEA requires that the product’s label
conspicuously state that it is a dietary supplement and not a
conventional food.58 However, an effect of this congressionally created
subcategory is that a food product can concurrently be classified as both

54
See Michael McCarthy, Energy Drink Abuse Worries Health Pros: Big Quantities Might
Result in Problems, USA TODAY, July 2, 2009, at 6C (discussing the FDA’s lack of power to
regulate dietary supplements like energy drinks). FDA spokeswoman Susan Cruzan
stated, “[w]e have no guidance or regulations that govern the formulation of energy
drinks . . . . Under current law, the manufacturer is responsible for ensuring that its
products are safe and such products do not require FDA premarket review or approval.”
Id.
55
See 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff) (2006) (providing the statutory definition of a dietary
supplement); Hutt, FDA Statutory Authority to Regulate the Safety of Dietary Supplements,
supra note 43, at 166 (stating procedural provisions of the DSHEA).
56
See Hutt, FDA Statutory Authority to Regulate the Safety of Dietary Supplements, supra
note 43, at 166 (discussing why a food product may be considered a dietary supplement);
Suzan Onel, Dietary Supplements: A Definition That is Black, White, and Gray, 31 AM. J.L. &
MED. 341, 348 (2005) (claiming that the DSHEA is a lenient and ambiguous statute).
57
See Barbara A. Noah, Foreword: Dietary Supplement Regulation in Flux, 31 AM. J.L. &
MED. 147, 148 (2005) (explaining Congress’s intention in drafting the DSHEA). 21 U.S.C.
§ 201(ff)(1) of the FDCA, as augmented by DSHEA, defines a “dietary supplement” as
a product (other than tobacco) intended to supplement the diet that
bears or contains one or more of the following dietary ingredients:
(A) a vitamin;
(B) a mineral;
(C) an herb or other botanical;
(D) an amino acid;
(E) a dietary substance for use by man to supplement the diet by
increasing the total dietary intake; or
(F) a concentrate, metabolite, constituent, extract, or combination
of any ingredient described in clause (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E).
21 U.S.C. § 201(ff)(1) (2006). See Hutt, FDA Statutory Authority to Regulate the Safety of
Dietary Supplements, supra note 43, at 159 (discussing the statutory overlap regarding the
definition of dietary supplements and conventional foods).
58
See Hutt, FDA Statutory Authority to Regulate the Safety of Dietary Supplements, supra
note 43, at 166 (discussing labeling requirements for dietary supplements and conventional
foods).
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a conventional food and as a dietary supplement.59 Likewise, two
products containing the exact same vitamins and minerals can be
classified as either a dietary supplement or conventional food product
depending on marketing claims.60 Simply changing the label can remove
a product from one category and place it in the other.61 Although it may
appear that the FDA’s regulatory authority of dietary supplements is
lacking, the FDA nonetheless mandates producers of dietary
supplements to abide by the labeling guidelines promulgated by 21
C.F.R. § 101.36.62
The DSHEA permits dietary supplement manufacturers to market
their products without receiving any pre-market authorization from the
FDA.63 Thus, as long as a manufacturer marketed its “new dietary
ingredient” (“NDI”) before October 15, 1994, it could sell its dietary
supplement without FDA approval.64 The DSHEA assumes that
individual components of a whole food product cannot cause harm, even
Ultimately, however, the
when ingested in large quantities.65
manufacturer’s “product definition, product safety, nutritional support
claims, and labeling” determine the extent of the FDA’s regulatory
power.66 Although the FDA’s authority to regulate dietary supplements
and conventional foods is relatively weak, the FDA possesses
considerably broader authority to control the tobacco industry.67
Id. at 159.
Id.
61
Id.
62
21 C.F.R. § 101.36 (2006); Hutt, FDA Statutory Authority to Regulate the Safety of Dietary
Supplements, supra note 43, at 166. “A product that is explicitly labeled as a dietary
supplement must bear the ‘Supplement Facts’ box on the label, in accordance with FDA
regulations promulgated under the authority of DSHEA.” Id. at 166. However, “[a] food
that is not explicitly labeled as a dietary supplement on the principal display panel of the
label must instead bear the ‘Nutrition Facts’ box in accordance with regulations
promulgated by FDA under the authority of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of
1990.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
63
See Noah, supra note 57, at 149 (defining “dietary supplement” as stated in the
DSHEA).
64
Id. However, if the manufacturer marketed the NDI after October 15, 1994, the
company must file a notification with the FDA at least seventy-five days prior to market
introduction, which provides the basis for the manufacturer’s conclusion that the
supplement is reasonably safe and must demonstrate only that there is a history of use or
other evidence of safety. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See 21 U.S.C. § 350b(a)(2)
(2006) (providing safety guidelines for dietary supplements).
65
Peter J. Cohen, Science, Politics, and the Regulation of Dietary Supplements: It’s Time to
Repeal DSHEA, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 175, 176 (2005).
66
Jennifer Kay Braman, Note, Food for Sport or Faustian Bargain: Regulating Performance
Enhancing Dietary Supplements, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 417, 431 (1999).
67
See infra Part II.C (discussing the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control
Act of 2009); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
59
60

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 [2011], Art. 7

702

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

C. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009
Amidst the fervor of President Obama’s election, Congress passed a
law granting the FDA extensive authority to regulate a sector not far
removed from the energy drink business—the tobacco industry.68 On
June 22, 2009, President Obama signed into law the Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“FSPTCA”), which now grants the
FDA the broad power to regulate the manufacturing, marketing, and
distribution of tobacco products.69
Some academics contend that in the last forty years, the FDA was
creative in interpreting its own statutory authority.70 In the early 1970s,
top FDA officials offered the opinion that the FDCA represents a “broad
‘constitution’ authorizing the FDA to protect the public health by any
(1984) (providing a two-part test to determine whether an agency properly interpreted its
enabling statute); Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest is Silence:
Chevron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1513–
15 (2009) (providing case law that challenged the FDA’s scope of authority under the
FDCA); Craig A. Conway, FDA Gains Regulatory Authority over Tobacco, HEALTH LAW
PERSPECTIVES, July 2009, available at http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/
2009/(CC)%20Tobacco.pdf (discussing the FSPTCA and the FDA’s expanded authority to
regulate tobacco).
68
See infra note 74 and accompanying text (providing the purpose of the Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act).
69
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat.
1776 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006 & Supp. 2009)). Congress
passed the FSPTCA “[t]o protect the public health by providing the Food and Drug
Administration with certain authority to regulate tobacco products.” Id.; see also Hunter v.
Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1046–48 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing whether state law
claims are preempted by congressional policy).
70
See Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Nicotine Withdrawal: Assessing the FDA’s Effort to
Regulate Tobacco Products, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) (alleging that the FDA may be
interpreting its statutory authority to regulate tobacco too broadly); see also, e.g., FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000) (deciding whether Congress
intended for the FDA to regulate tobacco under the FDCA); 62 Cases of Jam v. United
States, 340 U.S. 593, 600 (1951) (“In our anxiety to effectuate the congressional purpose of
protecting the public, we must take care not to extend the scope of the statute beyond the
point where Congress indicated it would stop.”); Se. Minerals, Inc. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 758,
767 (5th Cir. 1980) (criticizing the FDA’s “bureaucratic hubris that confuses abuse of power
with reason”); United States v. Parkinson, 240 F.2d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1956) (“The record of
the past few decades is replete with examples of the tendency of executive agencies to
expand their field of operations. A passion and a zeal to crusade affects their operations.”);
H. Thomas Austern, Philosophy of Regulation: A Reply to Mr. Hutt, 28 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J.
189, 191 (1973) (criticizing the suggestion that “a well-motivated administrative agency can
legally do what it alone deems desirable unless Congress has in advance specifically
prohibited it”); James D. Poliquin, Comment, The Incremental Development of an ExtraStatutory System of Regulation: A Critique of Food and Drug Administration Regulation of Added
Poisonous and Deleterious Substances, 33 ME. L. REV. 103, 103 (1981) (“[T]he agency has
chosen to take advantage of the statute’s ambiguity to enhance its regulatory powers, often
assigning strained interpretations of the statute to advance the agency’s perceived goals.”).
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necessary and proper means, rather than a limited and precise
delegation of Congress’ legislative power.”71 In many cases, courts give
deference to the FDA’s statutory authority and do not challenge its
interpretation of regulations; however, the same cannot be said for
tobacco regulation.72
Preceding ratification of the FSPTCA, the majority of legislative
proposals to control the tobacco industry were in the form of tax
increases, advertising bans, or warning labels.73 The FSPTCA heightened
the FDA’s ability to regulate the tobacco industry in that it could now
control the manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of tobacco
products.74 On March 3, 2009, Representative Henry Waxman of
Noah & Noah, supra note 70, at 7–8; see Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation
Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 28 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 177, 178 (1973)
[hereinafter Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation] (Hutt writes, “the Act must be regarded as a
constitution. . . . The mission of the [FDA] is to implement [its fundamental] objectives
through the most effective and efficient controls that can be devised”). See also United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943) (suggesting that the FDCA is “a working
instrument of government and not merely as a collection of English words”).
72
See generally Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation, supra note 71, at 178–79. See, e.g., Miss.
Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 386 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“Our agency deference cases have always been limited to statutes the agency was
‘entrusted to administer.’”) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
73
See Shaukat Karjeker, Federal Preemption of Cigarette Products Liability Claims Creates a
Need for Congressional Action, 6 REV. LITIG. 339, 364 (1987); Scott Richardson, Attorney
General’s Warning: Legislation May Now Be Hazardous to Tobacco Companies’ Health, 28
AKRON L. REV. 291, 312–21 (1995) (providing a general background regarding tobacco
legislation and descriptions of multiple tobacco-related state and federal cases); see also Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982) (taxing
specific products such as tobacco and alcohol, also known as a sin tax). In 1984, Congress
decided to add content to the “is dangerous” assertion by mandating the use of four
warnings of specific health effects.
Karjeker, supra, at 345.
Congress required
manufacturers to print one of the following four warnings on their cigarette packages:
SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer,
Heart Disease, Emphysema, and May Complicate Pregnancy[;]
SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly
Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health[;]
SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women
May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight[;
or]
SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains
Carbon Monoxide.
Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006)).
74
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATING TOBACCO—AN FDA PERSPECTIVE,
http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/uc
m171683.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2010). The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act empowers the FDA with the broad authority to:
Requir[e] companies who manufacture or import tobacco products to
provide FDA with a listing of the amounts of all ingredients in the
71
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California first introduced the bill in the House of Representatives as
H.R. 1256.75 In his opening remarks of a floor debate, Representative
Waxman asserted that in the past tobacco companies misled the
American public, and if the bill passed, it would be a “great victory for
all Americans, especially our children.”76 A number of Representative
Waxman’s colleagues expressed concern that the FDA would be
overburdened and the FSPTCA underfunded if the Act passed.77 The
tobacco products they produce[;] . . . [r]equire companies to provide
information about the amount of nicotine in their products to FDA and
the public[;] . . . [w]hen appropriate for protecting public health, to
adopt standards for nicotine yields and for the reduction or
elimination of other harmful substances that may be present in tobacco
products[;] [r]equir[e] that FDA must review an application and
determine the product meets certain standards before tobacco
products can be marketed and promoted as being “light,” “mild” or
“low”[;] Premarket review by FDA is also required for tobacco
products that were not commercially marketed as of February 15, 2007,
or were modified after that date[;] [r]equir[e] the warnings on tobacco
products to cover 50 percent of the front and back panels of the
package and that text be large and legible[;] . . . issue regulations
regarding the advertising of, and access to, tobacco products[; and]
[e]stablish[] a Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee to
provide advice, information, and recommendations to FDA, such as on
safety, dependence, or other health issues related to tobacco products.
Id. The law also “contains provisions designed to limit young people’s access to tobacco
products, as well as restrictions on marketing to curb the appeal of these products to
minors.” Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 31, 458 (July 1,
2009); see also Effective Dates of New FDA Tobacco Law Provisions, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCOFREE KIDS, http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/reports/fda/fda_effective_dates.pdf (last
visited Oct. 3, 2010) (providing a timeline for implementation of the FSPTCA).
75
155 CONG. REC. H2923 (daily ed. March 3, 2009) (statement of Rep. Waxman). This bill
was passed in the House of Representatives on April 2, 2009, by recorded vote. 155 CONG.
REC. H4414 (daily ed. April 2, 2009) The totals were 298 ayes, 112 noes, and 21 not voting.
Id. The bill passed in the Senate on June 11, 2009, by roll call vote. 155 CONG. REC. S6501
(daily ed. June 11, 2009). The totals were 79 yeas, 17 nays, and 3 not voting. Id.
76
155 CONG. REC. H4318–39 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 2009) (statement of Rep. Waxman). Rep.
Waxman further stated, “[i]n 1996, the Food and Drug Administration tried to regulate
tobacco products, but the Supreme Court told them that they needed Congress to give
them specific legal authority. Now, 13 years later, here we are finally giving FDA that
authority to regulate the leading preventable cause of death in America.” Id.
77
Id. Representative Waxman addressed this concern by stating the following:
[t]he tobacco program will be fully funded through a new user fee
paid for by the industry. That money will go exclusively to the new
tobacco center and will be enough for FDA to handle this task well.
Furthermore, by doing so, we will ensure that the new tobacco
program will have no impact on other missions at the Food And Drug
Administration.
Id.; see also Halimah Abdullah, Senators Who Opposed Tobacco Bill Received Top Dollar from
Industry, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, June 11, 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/257/
story/69925.html (providing statements from various Senators who believe the FDA lacks
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Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”), however, estimates that the
FSPTCA will reduce the budget deficit by $200 million over the 2010 to
2014 period and by $800 million over the 2010 to 2019 period.78
Moreover, the FSPTCA assesses fees on companies that manufacture or
import tobacco products and utilizes the money in a discretionary fund
to regulate the tobacco products.79 The CBO estimates that the amount
of tax revenues and settlement funds collected by state and local
governments may decline due to reduced consumption of tobacco
products.80
the resources needed to direct and enforce the FSPTCA). But see 155 CONG. REC. H4341
(Apr. 1, 2009) (describing that the FDA does not have the resources necessary to more
comprehensively regulate the tobacco industry).
78
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE, H.R. 1256: FAMILY SMOKING
PREVENTION AND TOBACCO CONTROL ACT (Mar. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/111/bills.cbo/h1256.pdf; see also FDA, FISCAL YEAR
2010 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: INTRODUCTION AND MISSION,
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports
/BudgetReports/UCM153491.pdf (providing an overview of the proposed 2010 FDA
budget).
79
FDA, FISCAL YEAR 2010 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
INTRODUCTION AND MISSION, supra note 78. The legislation would authorize the quarterly
assessment of fees on manufacturers and importers of such products. It would authorize
the appropriation of assessments equal to $85 million in 2009, $235 million in 2010, $450
million in 2011, $477 million in 2012, $505 million in 2013, $534 million in 2014, $566 million
in 2015, $599 million in 2016, $635 million in 2017, $672 million in 2018, and $712 million in
2019 and each subsequent year. Id. In addition, the Congressional Budget Office estimates
that implementing the program to assess fees to cover new FDA costs associated with
regulating tobacco would reduce net discretionary outlays by $149 million over the 2010–
2014 period and by $70 million over the 2010–2019 period because the spending of fees
would lag behind their collection. Id. Further, the CBO articulated that
H.R. 1256 would impose a number of private-sector mandates, as
defined in UMRA, on companies that manufacture or import tobacco
products. CBO estimates that the total direct cost of these mandates
would exceed the threshold established by UMRA ($139 million in
2009, adjusted annually for inflation) in each year, beginning with
2010. The bill would assess a fee on manufacturers and importers of
tobacco products to cover the cost to FDA of regulating those products.
The aggregate payments would sum to $235 million in 2010, and rise to
more than $500 million a year by 2013.
Id.; see 155 CONG. REC. H4339 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 2009) (explaining that the FSPTCA will be
fully funded through a new user fee paid for by the tobacco industry); U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., TOBACCO PRODUCT FEES, http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/Tobacco
ProductFees/default.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2010) (stating that the user fee program will
generate $4.5 billion from 2009–2018); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., USER FEES,
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/default.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2010)
(discussing the user fee program and funding for years 2009–2018).
80
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE, H.R. 1256: FAMILY SMOKING
PREVENTION AND TOBACCO CONTROL ACT (Mar. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/111/bills.cbo/h1256.pdf. The CBO stated that
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Congress’s rationale behind the enactment of the FSPTCA was that
advertising, marketing, and the promotion of tobacco products attracts
young people to use tobacco products, and these efforts have resulted in
Congress expressed concern that promotional
increased use.81
marketing and advertising methods expose minors to tobacco products.82

Id.

[i]n 2008, state and local governments collected about $19 billion in
revenues from excise and general sales taxes levied on tobacco
products. CBO estimates that this bill would lower consumption of
those products and that excise taxes collected by state and local
governments would fall by about $20 million in 2010, with that
reduction growing to over $330 million in 2014. Similarly, the CBO
estimates that state and local governments would see a decline in
sales-tax revenues of about $170 million over the 2010–2014 period.

Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat.
1776, 1777 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006 & Supp. 2009)). This Act
states:
Tobacco use is the foremost preventable cause of premature death
in America. It causes over 400,000 deaths in the United States each
year, and approximately 8,600,000 Americans have chronic illnesses
related to smoking.
Reducing the use of tobacco by minors by 50 percent would
prevent well over 10,000,000 of today’s children from becoming
regular, daily smokers, saving over 3,000,000 of them from premature
death due to tobacco-induced disease.
Id. (original numbering omitted). “In 2005, the cigarette manufacturers spent more than
$13,000,000,000 to attract new users, retain current users, increase current consumption,
and generate favorable long-term attitudes toward smoking and tobacco use.” Id. § 1333,
123 Stat. at 1778, ¶16. Numerous reports conclude that tobacco use is harmful for an
individual’s health largely due to the chemicals included in cigarettes, cigars, and
smokeless tobacco. See ANTHONY L. KOMAROFF, HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL FAMILY
HEALTH GUIDE 58 (1999) (providing an overview of the deleterious effects of tobacco use).
According to Komaroff, “[t]obacco smoke contains more than 4,000 chemicals, many of
which are known to be carcinogens (cancer-causing agents). . . . Nicotine is an addictive
chemical that, when absorbed through the lungs, affects the cardiovascular and nervous
systems.” Id. More specifically, “[s]moking has been established as a factor in the
development of coronary artery disease; lung cancer; bronchitis; emphysema; cancer of the
larynx; lip, and oral cavity; cancer of the bladder and stomach; duodenal ulcer; and
allergies.” GORDON EDLIN & ERIC GOLANTY, HEALTH & WELLNESS 396 (10th ed. 2010).
82
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 1333. Congress also found
that
[c]hildren are exposed to substantial and unavoidable tobacco
advertising that leads to favorable beliefs about tobacco use, plays a
role in leading young people to overestimate the prevalence of tobacco
use, and increases the number of young people who begin to use
tobacco.
....
Children are more influenced by tobacco marketing than adults:
more than 80 percent of youth smoke three heavily marketed brands,
while only 54 percent of adults, 26 and older, smoke these same
brands.
81
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“Through advertisements during and sponsorship of sporting events,
tobacco has become strongly associated with sports and has become
portrayed as an integral part of sports and the healthy lifestyle
associated with rigorous sporting activity.”83 The FSPTCA regulations
will further the government’s substantial interest in preventing lifethreatening health consequences to the populace and advance the goal of
reducing tobacco usage by the youth of America.84 As a result of
ratification of the FSPTCA, the United States may possibly become a
model nation piloting the pathway to a healthier public that is less
dependent on tobacco.85 Congress can further this aim of developing a
healthier public by uniting with other foreign nations in their endeavor
to regulate heavily caffeinated beverages, such as energy drinks.86
D. The Thirst for Regulation in America and the Nourishment of Regulation
Abroad
As the market for energy drinks in the United States increases, so
does the push for FDA regulation.87 Compared to its regulation
Tobacco company documents indicate that young people are an
important and often crucial segment of the tobacco market.
Id. § 1333, 123 Stat. at 1778, ¶¶20, 23, 24 (original numbering omitted).
83
Id.; see also supra note 52 (discussing the energy drink target market and advertising
efforts by energy drink manufacturers).
84
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 1333, 123 Stat. at 1779; see
Barak Y. Orbach, The New Regulatory Era—An Introduction, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 561–65
(2009) (discussing regulatory trends); Justice Sonia Sotomayor & Nicole A. Gordon,
Returning Majesty to the Law and Politics: A Modern Approach, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 35, 40
(1996) (noting that many believe that reliance on regulatory measures may decrease
personal responsibility and accountability); see also Credit Card Accountability
Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (“the Credit CARD Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123
Stat. 1734 (2009) (illustrating that personal responsibility is essential to the success of
regulation); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (expanding the
scope of protection against discrimination for employees); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (prompting the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act); Remarks by
President Barack Obama at Signing of the Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility and
Disclosure Act (May 22, 2009) (underscoring the tension between responsibility and
regulation).
85
See supra note 81 (providing the goals of tobacco regulation through the FSPTCA).
86
See infra Part II.D (explaining how many foreign nations regulate heavily caffeinated
beverages).
87
See generally Reissig, supra note 52, at 2 (discussing beverage regulatory aspects). In
2008, neuroscientist Roland Griffiths from Johns Hopkins School of Medicine in Baltimore
wrote to the FDA urging the agency to require manufacturers to list caffeine content of
energy drinks on the can, to set a threshold on the amount of stimulant in the drinks, and
to require conspicuous warning labels. Weise, supra note 49, at 6D. One hundred scientists
and physicians joined Griffiths in writing letters to the FDA requesting heightened
regulation of energy drinks because the drinks’ high caffeine content puts young drinkers
at risk for caffeine intoxication and alcohol-related injuries. Id. Griffiths also claimed that
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regarding over-the-counter (“OTC”) caffeine-containing stimulants, the
FDA is lenient in regulating the caffeine content of energy drinks and
permits manufacturers to market and sell their products devoid of
warning labels that would recommend proper consumption and display
the amount of caffeine contents.88 According to the FDA, an OTC
product identified as a “stimulant” or “alertness aid” must display
specific warnings on the packaging.89 Moreover,
[i]t is a striking inconsistency that, in the U.S. an OTC
stimulant medication containing 100 mg of caffeine per
tablet (e.g. NoDoz) must include . . . warnings, whereas
a 500 mg energy drink can be marketed with no such
warnings and no information on caffeine dose amount
in the product.90

because federal law does not require energy drink companies to disclose the amount of
caffeine in their drinks, it “is like having a glass of alcohol to drink . . . and you don’t know
whether you’re drinking straight vodka or beer.” Mayhood, supra note 49.
88
Reissig, supra note 52, at 2. The energy drink market is not slowing down, and energy
drink manufacturers are trying to “one-up” each other; thus, “energy shots” have entered
the picture. See William Neuman, “Energy Shots” Stimulate Power Drink Sales, N.Y. TIMES,
July 11, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/11/business/11energy.html. Neuman
explains the following:
The two-ounce drinks, which give people a concentrated dose of
caffeine, B vitamins and amino acids, were all but unheard-of four
years ago. Today they are the hottest drink category in the country,
with sales expected to almost double this year from last, to about $700
million. . . . The market is dominated by a tiny company in suburban
Detroit called Living Essentials, which began test sales in late 2004 of a
product called 5-Hour Energy, packaged in small plastic bottles.
Id.
89
21 C.F.R. § 340.50 (2009). The statute identifies one of the labeling requirements as
follows:
The labeling of the product contains the following warnings under the
heading “Warnings”:
(1) “The recommended dose of this product contains about as
much caffeine as a cup of coffee. Limit the use of caffeine-containing
medications, foods, or beverages while taking this product because too
much caffeine may cause nervousness, irritability, sleeplessness, and,
occasionally, rapid heart beat.”
(2) “For occasional use only. Not intended for use as a substitute
for sleep. If fatigue or drowsiness persists or continues to recur,
consult a” (select one of the following: “physician” or “doctor”).
(3) “Do not give to children under 12 years of age.”
Id. § 340.50(c).
90
See Reissig, supra note 52, at 3 (describing the regulatory guidelines OTC caffeine
stimulants must follow).
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Although there is dispute regarding whether energy drink and
caffeine consumption is beneficial, there is nonetheless a consensus
among researchers that caffeine consumption can result in adverse
health consequences, especially at high doses.91 For example, such
adverse effects of over-consumption may include nervousness,
irritability, sleeplessness, increased urination, abnormal heart rhythms
(arrhythmia), decreased bone density, and upset stomach.92 Another
harmful consequence of over-consumption is caffeine intoxication—a
Simon & Mosher, supra note 46. One modern study concluded that
[c]affeine does not improve maximal oxygen capacity directly, but
could permit the athlete to train at a greater power output and/or to
train longer. It has also been shown to increase speed and/or power
output in simulated race conditions. These effects have been found in
activities that last as little as 60 seconds or as long as 2 hours.
GRAHAM, T.E., Caffeine and Exercise: Metabolism, Endurance and Performance, Abstract, 31
SPORTS MED. 785–807 (2001), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11583104.
“The limited information available suggests that caffeine non-users and users respond
similarly and that withdrawal from caffeine may not be important.” Id. See Jerome H.
Jaffe, Psychoactive Substance Use Disorders, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 642,
683 (1989) (illustrating that energy drinks are one of the most widely used psychoactive
drugs in the world); see also Wallace B. Pickworth, Caffeine Dependence, LANCET, Apr. 29,
1995, at 1066 (stating that caffeine is “a psychoactive drug used by 80% of the population of
the USA”), cited in Gwendolyn Prothro, The Caffeine Conundrum: Caffeine Regulation in the
United States, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 65, 66 (1996–1997) (describing the scientific composition of
caffeine).
92
Heneman & Zidenberg-Cherr, supra note 46; see Drug Products for Over-the-Counter
Human Use, 53 Fed. Reg. 6100, 6103 (Feb. 29, 1988) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 340); ANN
MARIE SCHULTZ, ET AL., CITIZEN PETITION FOR NEW LABELING REQUIREMENTS FOR CAFFEINE
IN FOOD, Jan. 15, 2006, available at http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/dockets/
06p0039/06p-0039-cp00001-01-vol1.pdf (providing a description of the adverse effects of
caffeine consumption); Prema B. Rapuri et al., Caffeine Intake Increases the Rate of Bone Loss in
Elderly Women and Interacts with Vitamin D Receptor Genotypes, 74 AM. J. CLINICAL
NUTRITION 694, 699 (2001) (follow http://www.ajcn.org/cgi/content/full/74/5/ 694
hyperlink; then follow “Full Text (PDF)” hyperlink) (finding a correlation between bone
loss in post-menopausal women and caffeine consumption); News Release, Duke
University Medical Center, Caffeine’s Effects are Long-Lasting and Compound Stress,
http://www.dukemednews.org/news/article.php?id=5687 (full article appears in the
July/August, 2002 issue of Psychosomatic Medicine) (providing the findings of a study
comparing caffeine consumption with stress levels); Denise Grady, Pregnancy Problems Tied
to Caffeine, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/21/health/
21caffeine.html (finding that the risk of miscarriage significantly increases with caffeine
consumption); James Lane et al., Cutting Caffeine May Help Control Diabetes, DUKE MEDICINE
NEWS & COMMUNICATIONS, Jan. 28, 2008, http://www.dukehealth.org/Health_Library/
News/10226 (last visited Sept. 14, 2010) (finding that excessive caffeine consumption
undermines efforts to control type 2 diabetes); Alex M. McDonald, Energy Drinks and
Exercise,
POWERBAR,
http://www.powerbar.com/articles/109/Energy_Drinks_and_
Exercise.aspx (last visited Oct. 3, 2010); Watch Your Caffeine Intake if You Are Prone to Kidney
Stones, MED. NEWS TODAY (Sept. 5, 2004), available at http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/
articles/12937.php (summarizing a study regarding caffeine’s effects on the development
of kidney stones).
91
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syndrome recognized by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders and the World Health Organization’s International
Classification of Diseases.93 Due in large part to the soaring popularity
of energy drinks and a steadily increasing amount of consumption by
young people, more serious cases of caffeine intoxication are being
reported in poison centers.94 The media has reported multiple cases of

AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 212 (Am. Psychiatric Ass’n 1994); WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE
ICD-10 CLASSIFICATION OF BEHAVIOURAL AND MENTAL DISORDERS: DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA
FOR RESEARCH, 5–6, available at http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/terminology/
ICD10ResearchDiagnosis.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2010); Reissig, supra note 52, at 4.
94
Heneman & Zidenberg-Cherr, supra note 46. “A recently-released report from
University of Massachusetts Medical School noted 4600 caffeine-related calls to the
American Association of Poison Control Centers in 2005, the most recent data available.
More than half involved people under 19, and 2345 required treatment in a health care
facility.”
“Caffeine Intoxication” Cases on Rise, CBS NEWS (July 17, 2008),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/07/17/earlyshow/health/main4267600.shtml?so
urce=RSSattr=Health_4267600. Caffeine abuse is occurring more frequently in the United
States and one study states:
Forty-one cases of caffeine abuse from caffeine-enhanced beverages
were reported to a U.S. poison control center from 2002 to 2004.
Another U.S. poison control center reported nine cases of adverse
reactions to the energy drink Redline from January 2004 to March 2006.
Eight of the nine patients were male, the youngest being 13 years of
age.
Reissig, supra note 52, at 5 (citation omitted). Research scientist Kathleen E. Miller of the
University of Buffalo Research Institute on Addictions examined the relationships between
energy drink consumption and risk-taking in college students and found a positive
correlation between consumption and substance abuse and unsafe sexual activity. See
Kathleen E. Weaver, Energy Drinks Linked to Risk-Taking Behaviors Among College Students,
UNIV. OF BUFF. RES. INST. ON ADDICTIONS (July 24, 2008), http://www.ria.buffalo.edu/
news/2008-07-24.html. Recently, 795 Western New York college students participated in
the study, which concluded:
Frequent energy drink consumers (six or more days a month),
according to Miller’s findings, were approximately three times as
likely as less frequent energy drink consumers or non-consumers to
have smoked cigarettes, abused prescription drugs and been in a
serious physical fight in the year prior to the survey. They reported
drinking alcohol, having alcohol-related problems and using
marijuana about twice as often as non-consumers. They were also
more likely to engage in other forms of risk-taking, including unsafe
sex, not using a seatbelt, participating in an extreme sport and doing
something dangerous on a dare. The associations with smoking,
drinking, alcohol problems and illicit prescription use were found for
white but not black students.
Id.; see Heather Warlick, Energy Drink Use May Cause Addiction, Risky Behavior Email,
OKLAHOMAN (Okla. City, Okla.), Nov. 4, 2008, at 2E (providing statistics regarding the
behavior of students following drinking alcohol with energy drinks); Public Health; Study
Shows Energy Drink “Cocktails” Lead to Increased Injury Risk, MED. LETTER ON THE CDC &
93
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caffeine toxicity resulting from consumption of energy drinks affecting a
wide range of consumers from middle school-aged children to
professional athletes.95 One serious case occurred in Australia where a
twenty-eight-year-old motocross athlete’s heart stopped in a competition
because he had consumed eight cans of Red Bull over five hours.96 As
evidenced by such tragic anecdotes, different individuals respond
differently to caffeine—non-habitual users may experience dramatic
boosts in athletic and cognitive performance because they are not
tolerant to caffeine’s stimulant effect.97

FDA VIA NEWSRX.COM & NEWSRX.NET, Nov. 25, 2007, at 74 (providing the results of a Wake
Forest University School of Medicine study regarding alcohol and energy drinks).
95
Heneman & Zidenberg-Cherr, supra note 46. For instance, the King Philip Regional
School District in Massachusetts decided to rewrite the middle school student handbook to
discourage the consumption of energy drinks after a student got sick on a school ski trip.
Michele Morgan Bolton, Some Schools Put the Lid on High-Caffeine Beverages; Say Energy
Drinks Pose Health Risk Packed With Caffeine, BOST. GLOBE, July 25, 2009, at 1. Parents and
school officials from Dudley-Charlton School Committee became concerned when some
middle school students were “bouncing off the walls as the first bell of the day rang, with
racing pulses and pounding hearts, and then suffering a sluggish crash an hour or two
later.” Id. One death apparently linked to the consumption of Red Bull made the headlines
in 2000 when Irish athlete, Ross Cooney, eighteen, died of sudden adult death syndrome
hours after drinking four cans of the drink and playing in a basketball match. Following
the incident, France prohibited the energy drink, but it removed the ban only days later.
However, in countries such as Norway, Uruguay, and Denmark, it remains banned. See
French Ban on Red Bull (Drink) Upheld by European Court, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY, Feb. 8,
2004, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/5753.php. But see NANCY CLARK,
NANCY CLARK’S SPORTS NUTRITION GUIDEBOOK 178–79 (Heather Healy ed., Human
Kinetics 4th ed. 2008) (1990) (stating that energy drink consumption can enhance athletic
performance); BENNETT ALAN WEINBERG & BONNIE K. BEALER, THE CAFFEINE ADVANTAGE:
HOW TO SHARPEN YOUR MIND, IMPROVE YOUR PHYSICAL PERFORMANCE, AND ACHIEVE YOUR
GOALS—THE HEALTHY WAY 14 (2002) (describing the benefits of caffeine).
96
Daniel Dasey, Man’s Heart Stops After Red Bull Overdose, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Aug. 19, 2007, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2007/08/18/1186857834956.html. Dr.
Malcolm Barlow, a cardiologist who treated Mr. Penbross at Newcastle’s John Hunter
Hospital, said it appeared that excessive consumption of energy drinks had precipitated
the heart attack. Id. He further stated that Mr. Penbross had no other risk factors apart
from smoking and Mr. Penbross had previously told Dr. Barlow that he experienced chest
pain at times when his intake of the drinks was high. Id.
97
Id. According to Nancy Clark:
A study comparing regular caffeine users to nonusers reports that the
nonusers lasted eight and a half minutes longer when biking very hard
to exhaustion, as compared with when they had no preexercise
caffeine. The regular caffeine users exercised for only four minutes
longer when they had the caffeine fix.
CLARK, supra note 95, at 179. Because there is such a variance of efficacy with a drug like
caffeine, dosage is determined by these factors: “[y]our individual sensitivity to caffeine
(determined by genetics, personality type, state of health, and other factors)[; t]he rate at
which you metabolize caffeine[; and t]he benefit you are trying to receive from caffeine.”
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Regarding neurological effects, some studies show that the benefits
of caffeine ingestion depend on an intricate alteration of
neurotransmitters and an increased production of dopamine and
serotonin.98 As a result, caffeine can control neurotransmitters in a
manner that can improve temperament, reduce pain, suppress appetite,
and even protect brain cells from disease.99 Remarkably, a few experts
describe caffeine as the pop-icon drug of the twenty-first century—one
that offers the widest range of benefits among all drugs in the
pharmacopoeia.100 Regardless, the benefits of caffeine are complex and
variable, and according to those experts, “[w]hen using caffeine, the
guiding motto must be ‘[k]now thyself.’”101 These circumstances
prompted legislators in the United States and abroad to introduce
legislation that imposes stringent labeling requirements on energy drinks
and their packaging.102
For European Union (“EU”) member states, it is an arduous task to
maintain stringent regulations on energy drinks due to conflicts with EU

WEINBERG & BEALER, supra note 95, at 14. See id. (providing an overview of caffeine’s
benefits).
98
See id. at 11–12.
99
Id. Other benefits of caffeine consumption include the following:
As a stimulant, it perks us up in the morning and generally restore[s]
mental alertness or wakefulness during [states of] fatigue or
drowsiness. It may improve semantic memory, logical reasoning,
recall and recognition memory, at least transiently. As an analgesic
adjuvant in aspirin and aspirin/acetaminophen combinations, it helps
to reduce pain. And as an ingredient in menstrual drug products, it is
effective in combating the fatigue and water weight gain associated
with menstrual and pre-menstrual periods.
Prothro, supra note 91, at 68–69 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
100
WEINBERG & BEALER, supra note 95, at 1.
101
Id. The Yerkes-Dodson curve of caffeine activity illustrates the “highs” and “lows”
caffeine users experience. Id. at 14. Psychologists theorize “that there is an optimum level
of arousal for efficient performance. Other scientists explain the up then down dynamics
by theorizing that higher doses of caffeine have additional effects on the body that
suppress performance.” Id. (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Weinberg and Bealer iterate that “as you increase your dose, the positive effects of caffeine
increase until you reach a certain level, at which time these effects begin to reverse
themselves.” Id.
102
See generally Reissig, supra note 52 (implying that Congress should enact legislation to
protect Americans from the harmful effects of caffeine); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing
Public Health Against Individual Liberty: The Ethics of Smoking Regulations, 61 U. PITT. L. REV.
419, 433–34 (2000) (discussing the appropriateness for the government to intervene and
regulate under certain circumstances).
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trade agreements.103 The EU does require, however, that beverages in
excess of 150 mg/L of caffeine contain a warning label next to the title of
the product stating “[h]igh caffeine content” and the quantity of
caffeine.104 France, Sweden, and Denmark originally restricted the sale
of Red Bull, but following a slightly pro-energy drink decision by the
European Court of Justice, they removed the ban.105 Non-member States,
such as Norway, Iceland, and Turkey, however, may enact strict
legislation to regulate energy drinks because, as non-member States, EU
trade agreements do not bind them.106

EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR MONITORING ALCOHOL MARKETING, THE RAISE OF ALCOHOLIC
ENERGY DRINKS IN EUROPE 3 (2008), available at http://www.alcoholreclame.nl/content/
bestanden/the_raise_of_alcoholic_energy_drinks_in_europe8.pdf.
104
EUROPA, COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2002/67/EC OF JULY 18, 2002 ON THE LABELLING OF
FOODSTUFFS CONTAINING QUININE, AND OF FOODSTUFFS CONTAINING CAFFEINE,
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/consumers/product_labelling_and_packaging/l
21140_en.htm (follow “2002/67/EC” hyperlink).
105
Id. The European Court of Justice’s job is to ensure that EU legislation is interpreted
and applied consistently in all EU countries so that the law is equal for everyone. EUROPA,
EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND OTHER BODIES, THE COURT OF JUSTICE,
http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/justice/index_en.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2010). It
ensures, for example, that individual national courts do not contradict each other on the
same issue. Id. In Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic, 3.4.2004
OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 85/02 (Feb. 5, 2004), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:085:0002:0003:EN:PDF, the Court
of Justice held that the French Republic failed to fulfill its obligations under the European
Commission Treaty
by hindering the marketing in France of certain foodstuffs, such as
food supplements and dietary products containing the substances Ltartrate and L-carnitine, and confectionery and drinks to which certain
nutrients have been added, without establishing that the marketing of
such foodstuffs entails a real risk for public health.
Id. Prior to France’s efforts to ban Red Bull, Italy attempted unsuccessfully to ban the
marketing of energy drinks in excess of a certain limit. See Commission of the European
Communities v. Italian Republic, 2.8.2003 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
184/12 (June 19, 2003), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=OJ:C:2003:184:0012:0013:EN:PDF.
106
EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR MONITORING ALCOHOL MARKETING, supra note 103, at 3.
According to the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service:
[a] regulation released [by Turkey] in April 2005 modified the energy
drinks regulation and limited the caffeine levels to 320 mg per liter and
required health warnings on the label. On October 2006, another
directive numbered 2006/47 lowered the caffeine level to 150 mg per
liter, and required the labels to indicate a “Nutrition Facts” chart. Also
with this regulation, it is now required to indicate on the labels of
energy drinks, “Should not be consumed by mixing with alcohol. This
is not a sports drink. Not more than 500 ml should be consumed per
day. It is not recommended for children under 18, elderly, diabetics,
pregnant or breastfeeding women, or people sensitive to caffeine.”
103

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 [2011], Art. 7

714

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

Currently, scientific researchers, psychiatrists, and law professors
alike are expressing growing concern about the adverse effects of
excessive caffeine consumption.107 Moreover, legislators are joining the
bandwagon to “force drink-makers to come clean on caffeine,” especially
those who produce and distribute alcoholic energy drinks.108 In
USDA FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICES, GAIN REPORT, TURKEY: FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL
IMPORT REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS—NARRATIVE (2009). According to the Official
Gazette, on July 4, 2006, the Republic of Turkey decided to limit caffeine amounts in energy
drinks to 150 mg/L. Id. at 6. Individual energy-blend ingredients were limited as well. Id.
at 6–7. For instance, inositol cannot exceed 100 mg/L, glucuronolactone 20 mg/L, and
taurine 800 mg/L. Id.
Australia, Thailand, Uruguay, and Canada have also banned or imposed regulations
on the caffeine content and labeling of energy drinks.
See generally Weaver, supra note 94 (discussing energy drink regulation in foreign
countries); Reissig, supra note 52, at 2 (discussing labeling related to energy drinks).
Australia requires high-caffeinated beverages to display on the label advisory statements
that the food contains caffeine and the food is not recommended for children, pregnant or
lactating women, and individuals sensitive to caffeine. FOOD STANDARDS AUSTRALIA NEW
ZEALAND, STANDARD 2.6.4, FORMULATED CAFFEINATED BEVERAGES, available at
http://www.foodstandards.gov.au/thecode/foodstandardscode/standard264formulate42
70.cfm (follow “PDF” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 4, 2010). In addition, the label on an
energy drink must include an advisory statement such as, “[c]onsume no more than
[amount of one-day quantity (as cans, bottles or mL )] per day.” Id. (alterations in original).
In Thailand in 2002, the Thai Food and Drug Administration (“Thai FDA”) ruled that
advertisements for energy drinks be subject to certain restrictions on
the grounds that they were “misleading.”
Officials said the
advertisements appeared to be encouraging children to consume too
many energy drinks, with potential ill-health effects. After consulting
with industry, the [Thai] FDA decided to mandate a health warning on
all energy drink advertisements. The depiction of sports stars and
labourers in advertisements for energy drinks was also prohibited, but
the threat to ban the use of celebrities in advertisements was not
implemented.
Corinna Hawkes, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, MARKETING FOOD TO CHILDREN: THE
GLOBAL REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 32 (2004), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/
publications/2004/9241591579.pdf (footnotes omitted). See generally Weaver, supra note 94
(discussing regulations of energy drinks in various countries). In 2004, Canada decided to
permit sales of energy drinks but “now requires warning labels cautioning against use by
children or pregnant women, use in large quantities, or use with alcohol.” Id.
107
See Reissig, supra note 52 (providing a background of the ill effects of energy drink
consumption); SCHULTZ, supra note 92 (discussing physiological effects and illnesses that
may arise from excessive caffeine ingestion). The Food and Drug Law Class of Michigan
State University College of Law, directed by Adjunct Professor Neal Fortin, submitted a
Citizen Petition to the FDA “to request the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to issue a
regulation that would efficaciously inform the general public about the quantitative
caffeine content of the foods they consume.” Id. at 1.
108
Sen. Michael Switalski, Editorial, Force Drink-Makers to Come Clean on Caffeine, DETROIT
NEWS, Apr. 10, 2009. The caffeine regulation disagreement can actually be a catalyst for
progress. See, e.g., LLOYD ALBERT JOHNSON, A TOOLBOX FOR HUMANITY: MORE THAN 9000
YEARS OF THOUGHT 117 (2003) (providing thoughts and quotes about “Progress”). In a
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February 2009, Michigan Senator Michael Switalski introduced Michigan
Senate Bill 230 that would require energy drink manufacturers to print
the product’s caffeine content on the label.109 One month prior to the
warning letter to Phusion Projects Inc. (“Phusion”), the FDA informed the company that
the combination of ingredients (namely alcohol and caffeine), as it is used in its extremely
popular alcoholic energy drink, “Four Loko,” render the beverage adulterated, as defined
in section 402(a)(2)(c) of the FDCA. WARNING LETTER: PHUSION PROJECTS INC.,
INSPECTIONS, COMPLIANCE, ENFORCEMENT, AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. FOOD AND
DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/iceci/
enforcementactions/warningletters/ucm234023.htm. Four Loko, sold in an enormous 23ounce can, containing twelve percent alcohol and an energy blend, is widely consumed by
college-aged individuals callous to the beverage’s adverse effects. Abby Goodnough,
F.D.A. Expected to Take a Stand on Alcoholic Energy Drinks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/16/us/16drinks.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. In the
warning letter, Joann M. Givens, Acting Director of the Chicago FDA Office of Compliance
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, stated that
[t]here is no food additive regulation authorizing the use of caffeine as
a direct addition to alcoholic beverages, and we are not aware of any
information to establish that caffeine added directly to alcoholic
beverages is the subject of a prior sanction. Likewise, we are not aware
of any basis to conclude that caffeine is GRAS [“Genderally
Recognized As Safe”] under these conditions of use.
WARNING LETTER: PHUSION PROJECTS INC., supra. Givens further informed Phusion that it
“should take prompt action to correct [the] violation and prevent its recurrence” and
“[f]ailure to do so may result in enforcement action [such as seizure of the product and
injunctions and prosecutions] without further notice.” Id. Phusion was allowed fifteen
days to respond to the warning to state the specific steps it had taken to correct the
violation and to assure that similar violations would not occur. Id. Phusion immediately
released a public statement that it would remove the caffeine, guarana, and taurine from
Four Loko and iterated that the company “works with its distributors to share information
about the appropriate way to stock and market its products [and provides] point of sale
information that reinforces the importance of asking for ID when selling any alcoholic
beverage.” News Release: Phusion Projects to Remove Caffeine, Guarana and Taurine from
Products, PHUSION PROJECTS (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.phusionprojects.com/
media_reformulation.html. Notably, the FDA also issued warning letters to Charge
Beverages Corp. (maker of “Core”), New Century Brewing Co. (maker of “Moonshot”),
and United Brands Company, Inc. (maker of “Joose” and “Max”). Molly Peterson,
(Nov.
17,
2010),
Caffeinated
Alcoholic
Drinks
Are
Unsafe,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-17/caffeinated-alcohol-drinks-called-unsafein-warning-by-u-s-regulators.html; FDA Warns Makers of Alcoholic Energy Drinks, FOX NEWS
(Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/health/2010/11/17/fda-warns-makersalcoholic-energy-drinks/.
109
S. 230, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009). In an editorial, Senator Switalski asserted, “I
am a Democrat, but I got the two doctors in the Senate, both Republicans, to co-sponsor my
caffeine bill. You have a right to know the ingredients in your drink and your kid’s. It
should be on the label.” Switalski, supra note 108. Cf. Christine A. Klein, The Environmental
Deficit: Applying Lessons From the Economic Recession, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 651, 674 (2009)
(“There is a growing acceptance of the value of federal regulation, at least to prevent
egregious practices harmful to important national interests.”); David Leonhardt, A FreeMarket-Loving, Big-Spending, Fiscally Conservative Wealth Redistributionist, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
24, 2008, at 30 (providing a snapshot of America’s future economic policies); President’s
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introduction of Switalski’s bill, Maine Representative Peggy Pendleton
initiated her bill in the Maine House of Representatives that would
prohibit the sale of energy drinks to minors.110 Danny Ford, a
Representative from Kentucky, also introduced a bill that would make it
illegal for stores to sell energy drinks to minors.111 With the healthcare
debate at the forefront of American political thought, President Barack
Obama declared that taxation of sugar-sweetened beverages, such as
energy drinks, should be explored by Congress in order to reduce
consumption and protect the public health.112 Before Congress reaches
the decision to regulate, perhaps it could engage in the following
inquiry: first, assess the positive and negative health effects; second, if a
health risk is present, determine the extent of regulation necessary; and
third, ascertain whether adequate resources are available to enforce the
regulation.113

Remarks in New York City Regarding Financial Regulations, PUB. PAPERS (Sept. 14, 2009)
(implying that Congress should enact common sense regulation to protect Americans).
110
H.P. 12, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2009). Representative Pendleton’s bill was referred
to the Committee on Health and Human Services, but the Senate voted to kill the bill
pursuant to the Committee’s recommendation. Kevin Miller, Bill Curtailing Sale of Energy
Drinks
Spiked,
BANGOR
DAILY
NEWS,
Feb.
5,
2009,
available
at
http://www.bangordailynews.com/detail/98909.html.
111
H.B. 374, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008). Representative Ford’s bill defined energy drink
as “a carbonated beverage that exceeds a caffeine content of seventy-one (71) milligrams
per twelve (12) ounce serving and contains taurine and glucuronolactone.” Id. The bill
died at the end of the 2008 Regular Session because it did not make it out of the Health &
Welfare Committee. Kentucky Legislature, H.B. 374, http://www.lrc.ky.gov/RECORD/
08RS/HB374.htm. (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
112
See generally Elizabeth Lopatto, Soft-Drink Tax Could Pare Waistlines, Cover Health-Care
Costs, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 16, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001
&sid=aHd62qwNQt6g (describing obesity statistics in the United States and President
Obama’s solution to the problem). Public health and economic researchers posit that “[a]
penny-per-ounce tax on soda and other sugary drinks would raise about $150 billion over a
decade while slimming Americans’ waistlines.” Id. “The tax would apply to soft drinks,
energy drinks, sports beverages and many juices and iced teas, but not sugar-free diet
drinks.” Soft Drink Tax Debate Rages On, CONVENIENCE STORE NEWS (Sept. 18, 2009),
http://www.csnews.com/csn/cat_management/pack_bev/article_display.jsp?vnu_conte
nt_id=1004014003. Moreover,
[a] group of doctors, scientists and policy makers, though, have argued
the tax could be a weapon to reduce obesity, similar to the way
cigarette taxes have helped curb smoking. . . . They estimate a cent tax
per ounce on sugary beverages would raise $14.9 billion in its first
year, to be spent on health care initiatives, while also lower
consumption of soda and lead to weight loss and reduced health risk
for some Americans.
Id.
113
See Michael H. Cohen, U.S. Dietary Supplement Regulation: Belief Systems and Legal
Rules, 11 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 8 (2000) (explaining the tensions between increased and
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III. ANALYSIS
From its creation in 1938 to its present-day status as a multifaceted
agency, the FDA continues to follow a straightforward but difficult
congressional mandate—to protect the American public from
adulterated and misbranded food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics.114
Through the enactment of a bill that alters the language regarding the
manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of dietary supplements,
Congress could remedy the FDA’s lack of authority to regulate heavily
caffeinated energy beverages.115 Part III.A explores economic, political,
and philosophical elements that ultimately influence Congress’s decision
of whether to increase FDA regulatory power.116 Part III.B evaluates the
merits of caffeine regulation, focusing on the similarity between the
health consequences of tobacco use and caffeine consumption.117 Part
III.C explains whether the FDA, through its Congressional mandate and
support of amended acts, possesses the jurisdiction to regulate energy
drinks more effectively.118 Also, Part III.C compares this jurisdictional
question to the public policy concerns raised by those in opposition to
the newly enacted FSPTCA.119 Part III.D analyzes whether the FDA has
the monetary and human capital required to keep pace with such a
booming and rapidly expanding energy drink industry.120
A. An Economic and Philosophic Assessment of Regulation Applied to Energy
Drinks
The dispute regarding whether Congress should afford the FDA
broader authority to regulate consumer products like heavily caffeinated
beverages contains both political and philosophical elements.121 Passage
decreased governmental interference); Simon & Mosher, supra note 46, at 13 (proposing a
proactive course of action to increase regulation of energy drinks).
114
See supra note 25 (listing the multiple acts and amendments essential to the FDA’s
creation and expansion).
115
See infra Part IV (proposing a model regulation that affords the FDA with the power to
regulate the manufacturing, marketing, and labeling of energy drinks).
116
See infra Part III.A (evaluating various clashing arguments regarding increased FDA
regulatory authority).
117
See infra Part III.B (providing a comparison of the pharmacological and therapeutic
effects of tobacco and energy drinks).
118
See infra Part III.C (discussing whether the FDA has the power to regulate energy
drinks currently classified as dietary supplements).
119
See infra Part III.C (providing arguments in opposition to the FSPTCA that involve
policy concerns).
120
See infra Part III.D (discussing the plausibility concerning the notion that expanded
FDA regulation is infeasible due to a scarcity of resources).
121
See Cohen, supra note 113, at 8 (discussing the contradictory political and
philosophical ideologies in light of the DSHEA). Cohen generalizes that FDA regulation
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of such legislation may hinge upon either the occurrence of a distinct
political event or a philosophical shift of public opinion.122 Moreover,
the regulation debate concerns the regulatory proposal, policy, values,
and belief system of American society.123 Conceptually, the progression
of regulation is illustrated sequentially in that, “[o]ne’s core belief system
generates . . . [o]perative values, which generate . . . policy choices, which
generate . . . the regulatory proposal and arguments for such a
proposal.”124 This analytical framework, however, is unlikely to succeed
seamlessly from the bottom level to the peak because of the reality that
society has differing beliefs, morals, and values.125
It is imperative to note that these differences in opinion give rise to
three fundamental disagreements regarding increased FDA regulatory
power: whether the consumer is competent; whether paternalistic
regulation is obligatory; and whether such regulation leads to the
notorious slippery slope.126 The competent consumer approach is
illustrated by both economic and common sense methodologies that
suggest consumers continually and perhaps unknowingly engage in
cost-benefit analyses.127 From a macroeconomic outlook, the cost-benefit
methodology assumes that “all potential gains and losses from a
presents a tension between paternalism and autonomy, but “[p]aternalism involves
interference with autonomous choices.” Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 12. In his article, Michael H. Cohen provides a framework to analyze potential
dietary supplement regulations in a format analogous to Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs—
each level generates the succeeding one. Id.
124
Id. The bottom level, “Belief System,” “addresses what we ultimately believe about
such large topics as truth, human existence, the nature and purpose of the body. Do we
ultimately believe that science has all the answers?” Id. at 13. The next level, “Values,”
“asks who or what the rules and policies are attempting to protect. Is it the individual, the
wealth of an industry or the power of a government institution? What is foremost:
consumer autonomy, medical authority, or regulatory control? What are the ultimate
values guiding any balancing of these interests?” Id. The following level, “Policy,” “asks
what overall stance should legislation or regulation adopt . . . . What attitude should
govern rule-making? How should lawmakers, FDA officials, and others regard these
products . . . in health care? Should the posture be favorable or unfavorable?” Id. The top
level, “Regulatory Proposal,” “asks what legal rule is the most appropriate. . . . Or should
some intermediate category be created in which access is more carefully controlled by
federal officials?” Id. at 12.
125
Cf. Cohen, supra note 113, at 21 (“By creatively examining our core beliefs and the
values that underlie regulatory positions, the debate may be clarified, the doors of
perception may be opened, and, ideally, the laws that govern self-care may more faithfully
track the core of human aspirations toward health.”).
126
See infra notes 127–33 (discussing the competent consumer argument); infra notes 138–
44 (discussing whether the FDA should act preemptively with regulation); infra notes 145–
52 (providing the slippery slope argument regarding regulation of caffeine).
127
See SODERLIND, supra note 51, at 245 (describing the purpose of paternalistic
regulation).
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proposal are identified, converted into monetary units, and compared on
the basis of decision rules to determine if the proposal is desirable from
society’s standpoint.”128 However, on a microeconomic level and more
relevant to energy drinks, the “consumer choice theory” demonstrates
that individuals in a free-market setting choose products by weighing
preference, price, and potential health consequences of the product.129
Because consumers encounter trade-offs in their purchase decisions,
they “must combine budget constraints (what they can afford), and
preferences (what they would like to consume).”130 The economic model
of the consumer choice theory can also drive the supposition that
consumers are competent in their assessment concerning whether a
product with potential adverse effects requires regulation to protect the
public interest.131 In abstract economic terms, a regulation is “a
commodity made available in the political marketplace and supplied by
politicians and bureaucrats by reference to the demand of those who will
benefit from its promulgation.”132 Accordingly, regulatory tension is
present because individuals must face the consequences of their
actions—they may enjoy all the benefits but will bear all the costs.133
This regulatory conflict likely persists because of the notion that
personal responsibility reduces the need for government regulation, and
in turn, that regulation leads to dependency and irresponsibility.134 An
excellent expression regarding personal responsibility and regulation is
simply “that bad things may happen to responsible individuals and that
NAS, supra note 51, at 1–2.
See McCann, supra note 51, at 1177 (explaining the consumer choice theory in terms of
food purchases). McCann states: “In ranking, individuals determine the relative utility of
one choice over another, balanced against abilities and budgetary constraints, which attach
a relative cost to each prospective choice.” Id.
130
Theory of Consumer Choice, supra note 51.
131
See generally THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY REFORMS
FOR THE AGE OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 51, at 36 (providing a comparison of economic
regulation and social regulation).
132
Id. On the other hand, this regulatory tradeoff may be:
principally between politicians and industries which would benefit
from regulatory subsidies and barriers to entry. While different
groups could furnish political support, the price necessary to secure
the purchase, the transaction was most likely to be entered into by
those groups which could coordinate their influence at lowest cost,
thus tending to favour producers over, for example, consumers.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
133
SODERLIND, supra note 51, at 236. Soderlind writes, “[a]s economists see it, when
consumers are independent of one another any policy that imposes a change in behavior
constitutes an unwelcome encroachment on personal freedom.” Id.
134
Orbach, supra note 84, at 562; see, e.g., Sotomayor, supra note 84, at 40 (“Some would
argue that reliance on regulations alone defuses the notion of personal responsibility and
accountability.”).
128
129
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regulations may support and enable, rather than replace, personal
responsibility.”135 When sentiments in Washington tend to favor
increased regulation, policies held by those in power may impede the
ideology that responsible individuals can effectively control their fate
and improve their own well-being.136 Whether it actually materializes,
President Obama and Congress seem to share a goal of reconciling the
conflicting viewpoints concerning personal responsibility and regulation
by offering a common sense approach to regulation.137
Orbach, supra note 84, at 562 (explaining the competent consumer theory in regard to
government regulation). A current example of a regulation that implicates personal
responsibility is the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009
(“the Credit CARD Act”). Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009). Upon signing the
Credit CARD Act, President Obama emphasized that:
[Credit card] costs . . . often hit responsible credit card users. . . . With
this bill, we’re putting in place some common-sense reforms designed
to protect consumers . . . . [W]e’re not going to give people a free pass;
we expect consumers to live within their means and pay what they
owe. But we also expect financial institutions to act with the same
sense of responsibility that the American people aspire to in their own
lives.
Orbach, supra note 84, at 561–62 (alterations in original). President Obama’s remarks
underscore the tension between responsibility and regulation in that both the “common
practices of credit card companies hit many responsible credit card holders and that the
Credit CARD Act does not relieve consumers of their responsibility to pay debts to credit
card companies in full.” Id. at 562; see Remarks by President Barack Obama at Signing of
the Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act, supra note 84; see also
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (expanding the scope of
protection against discrimination for employees). The decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co. (holding that employees are barred from filing pay discrimination claims
based on employer’s decisions made 180 days ago or more) prompted President Obama to
sign into law the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. “The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act overruled
the Supreme Court decision, providing that the 180-day limitation starts with the last
discriminatory act.” Orbach, supra note 84, at 562, n.18.
136
Id. at 565.
137
See Klein, supra note 109, at 674 (“President Obama argued, ‘Now, if we’re honest with
ourselves, . . . we have not always met [our] responsibilities—as a government or as a
people. . . . Regulations were gutted for the sake of a quick profit at the expense of a
healthy market.’”); Orbach, supra note 84, at 560 (noting that “[l]ike it or not, one of
President Obama’s campaign promises for change was ‘common-sense regulation.’”).
Barack Obama utilized this promise to distinguish himself from President Bush and his
predecessors since President Reagan, who continuously deregulated markets. See id. (“The
promise for a ‘common-sense regulation,’ of course, also struck a sharp contrast between
President Obama and his opponent, Senator John McCain.”). In a interview for New York
Times Magazine concerning new regulation, Barack Obama stated:
Ronald Reagan . . . made people aware of the cost involved in
government regulation. . . . Bill Clinton, to some extent, continued that
pattern. . . . And George Bush took Ronald Reagan’s insight and ran it
over a cliff. . . .
[W]hat we need to bring about is the end of the era of
unresponsive and inefficient government and short-term thinking in
135
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In cases involving products that create the risk of addiction or
negative health consequences, some contend that government policies
designed to combat those problems face the risk of paternalism.138 Many
consumers opposed to paternalistic regulation invite danger and neglect
warning labels, arguing that it is an essential right for Americans to be
free to make their own mistakes.139 It is important to note, however, that
paternalistic governmental control is not a novel principle—it has existed
for millennia.140 At the heart of the regulatory debate is not necessarily
the divisive distinction between “soft paternalism” and “hard
paternalism,” but rather the risk of “slippage” from the former to the
Recently, a conceptual permutation of soft and hard
latter.141
government, so the government is laying the groundwork, the
framework, the foundation for the market to operate effectively and
for every single individual to be able to be connected with that market
and to succeed in that market.
Id. at 560, n.4 (alterations in original) (quoting Leonhardt, supra note 109, at 30
(interviewing Barack Obama during his Presidential campaign)); see also President’s
Remarks in New York City Regarding Financial Regulations, PUB. PAPERS (Sept. 14, 2009)
(providing the full text of President Obama’s speech concerning a major overhaul of
regulations of the financial system). President Obama states:
I have always been a strong believer in the power of the free
market. . . . I believe that the role of the government is not to disparage
wealth, but to expand its reach; not to stifle markets, but to provide the
ground rules and level playing field that helps to make those markets
more vibrant—and that will allow us to better tap the creative and
innovative potential of our people. . . .
So I promise you, I did not run for President to bail out banks or
intervene in capital markets. But it is important to note that the very
absence of common-sense regulations able to keep up with a fast-paced
financial sector is what created the need for that extraordinary
intervention—not just with our administration, but the previous
administration. The lack of sensible rules of the road, so often opposed
by those who claim to speak for the free market, ironically led to a
rescue far more intrusive than anything any of us—Democratic or
Republican, progressive or conservative—would have ever proposed
or predicted.
President’s Remarks in New York City Regarding Financial Regulations, PUB. PAPERS (Sept.
14, 2009) (emphasis added).
138
See SODERLIND, supra note 51, at 245 (discussing the negative aspects of paternalism).
139
Id. According to Soderlind, “[m]ost of these cases involve consumers who persist in
self-destructive behavior—smoking, drinking, sharing needles, and so on.” Id.
140
Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 51, at 685. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy’s definition, “[p]aternalism is the interference of a state or an individual with
another person, against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the person
interfered with will be better off or protected from harm.” Dworkin, supra note 51; see
Glaeser, supra note 51, at 133 (providing an overview of hard and soft paternalism).
141
See Orbach, supra note 84, at 569–70 (discussing “new paternalism” and objections to
this ideology). Orbach articulates that, in contrast to his theory of new paternalism, “Rizzo
and Whitman focus on the slippery-slope criticism against regulation and specifically the
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paternalism ideologies created what is now labeled the “new
paternalism.”142 Advocates of new paternalism “distinguish their views
from hard paternalism by emphasizing the moderate character of their
proposals.”143 In other words, the new paternalists proffer a theoretically
ideal standard conceivably applicable to energy drink regulation—a
significant improvement in individual health and welfare possibly
attained through little governmental intrusion that does not substantially
restrict liberty or autonomy.144

argument that soft paternalism may lead to hard paternalism, or in their words:
‘moderation is not sustainable . . . slippage is most likely.’” Id. at 569 (quoting Rizzo &
Whitman, supra note 51, at 688).
142
See Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 51, at 686 (“The new paternalism is supported by a
growing body of research in behavioral economics showing that individuals are not fully
‘rational,’ as economists understand that term, but instead are subject to a variety of
cognitive errors and biases.”). In contrast, “[w]hile Rizzo and Whitman raise serious valid
concerns about potential sliding on slippery slopes, they do not examine actual changes in
ideological hard paternalism with the rise of soft paternalism. Ideological hard paternalism
has always been around and probably will never disappear.” Orbach, supra note 84, at 569
(emphasis omitted). Controversial examples of hard paternalism include:
bans on sodomy, restrictions on same-sex intimate relationships, bans
on abortions, bans on same-sex marriage, prohibitions against teaching
evolution in public schools, and criminalization of fornication. Some
of these forms of hard paternalism were already abandoned because
courts held them unconstitutional. Others are still in effect at least in
some states. There is no conceptual link between soft paternalism that
intends to improve individual decision-making and ideological hard
paternalism. The governing political trend in the new regulatory era,
however, seems to be hostile toward ideological hard paternalism. It is
therefore unclear that the number of bans, mandatory requirements,
and other forms of hard paternalism is likely to increase.
Id. at 569–71 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
143
Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 51, at 687. With regard to the conceptual permutation of
soft and hard paternalism, “Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein frequently refer to their
proposals for debiasing behavior through law as a ‘middle ground’ between laissez-faire
and more heavy-handed paternalism, one that is a ‘less intrusive, more direct, and more
democratic response to the problem of bounded rationality.’” Id. (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 51, at 200–01).
144
See id. at 687 (explaining the chief purpose of the new paternalism ideology). Rizzo
and Whitman challenge the new paternalism theory stating that
accepting new paternalist policies creates a risk of accepting, in the
long run, greater restrictions on individual autonomy than have
heretofore been acknowledged. Inasmuch as new paternalists claim to
be interested in preserving autonomy, this surely must be taken into
account as an unrecognized or unacknowledged cost to be balanced
against any possible gains from their policies.
Id. at 688 (footnote omitted).
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A major setback for those in favor of more extensive caffeine
regulation is the notorious slippery slope argument.145 “The term
‘slippery’ slopes is shorthand for two related phenomena: slippery slope
arguments and slippery slope events.”146 Generally, there are at least
two sets of actors involved: the policymakers who created the legislation
and the citizens the legislation affects.147 Citizens opposed to potentially
rigid energy drink regulation pose a basic but formidable slippery slope
argument—if the government wishes to control the manufacturing,
marketing, and labeling of energy drinks, why not be consistent and
require the same of coffee, tea, chocolate, or other caffeinated
products?148
See id. at 689–90 (providing an overview of a slippery-slope argument). Rizzo &
Whitman note that “[a] slippery-slope argument (SSA) is an argument about how the
acceptance of one argument (regarding a decision, act, or policy) may lead to the
acceptance of other arguments (regarding other decisions, acts, or policies).” Id. In
addition, “[a] slippery-slope event (SSE) refers to the actual manifestation of the events
(decisions, acts, or policies) described in the SSA.” Id. at 690 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
146
Id. at 689 (emphasis omitted). Rizzo & Whitman point out that a slippery-slope
argument “describes a process or mechanism by which accepting the initial argument and
making the initial decision raise[s] the likelihood of accepting the later argument and
making the later decision.” Id. at 690 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
147
Id. An example of a slippery-slope situation is as follows: “the government imposes a
policy that protects people from the consequences of their mistakes (e.g., national health
insurance that covers the consequences of poor health choices), it may encourage moral
hazard and thus result in more mistakes (more bad health choices).” Id. The traditional
but highly controversial slippery-slope dilemma involves tobacco regulation. See Pope,
supra note 102, at 423 (discussing how tobacco regulations may infringe upon individual
autonomy). Regarding justification for government intrusion, Pope articulates that some
commentators believe
[t]he focus on the economic costs of personal behavior like
smoking . . . seems to suggest that if it were possible to limit the costs
to the smoker . . . there would be little justification for tolerating
government intrusion. According to the principle of the least
restrictive alternative, they are absolutely correct. If the harm that
smokers cause can be eliminated, prevented, or ameliorated in a
feasible way that does not interfere with smokers’ liberty, then ceteris
paribus that alternative ought to be preferred. Recouping the economic
costs of smoking may increase the cost of cigarettes, but it interferes
with liberty less than the direct prohibition of smoking. . . . On the
contrary, the costs imposed by smokers cannot justify laws restricting
smoking. . . . It would violate the least restrictive alternative principle
to interfere with smokers’ liberty so as to prevent the costs (if any) of
smoking when it is feasible, and in fact easier, to simply recover those
costs.
Id. at 443–44 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
148
See Brewington, supra note 53 (explaining opposing views regarding energy drink
regulation). Craig Stevens, speaking on behalf of the American Beverage Association in
145
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Those who favor energy drink regulation commonly counter the
slippery slope argument with the claim that a blanket regulation of
caffeine would be politically impractical and nearly impossible to
enforce.149 In addition, proponents of energy drink regulation could
assert that energy drinks, especially when paired with alcohol, are
extremely dangerous; thus, they are distinguishable from other regulated
beverages such as soft drinks.150 Although the slippery slope concept is
not novel or complex, it is likely the most compelling public policy
argument against increased regulation of energy drinks.151 Energy
drinks encompass many highs and lows, but because of the negative

regard to Chad Reissig and Roland Griffiths’ energy drink review, states that “[i]t’s
unfortunate that the authors of this article would attempt to lump all energy drinks
together in a rhetorical attack when the facts of their review clearly distinguish the
mainstream responsible players from novelty companies seeking attention and increased
sales based solely on sensationalistic names and extreme caffeine content.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Stevens also noted that
the “mainstream” energy drinks that his organization represents have
about half the caffeine content found in an average serving of coffee.
A 12-ounce cup of coffee contains about 200 milligrams of caffeine. An
8.3-ounce can of Red Bull has 80 milligrams. “So those suggesting that
energy drinks should require warning labels should be aware of the
slippery slope this would create . . . . To be consistent, products at
coffeehouses also would require such unnecessary labeling.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Conversely, Thaddeus Mason Pope claims that
“[r]egulating public health risks with the goal of preventing harm to others has proven to
be the most politically compelling rationale for government intervention.” Pope, supra note
102, at 433–34. Pope counters the individual autonomy argument stating that
[t]oday, the argument that “[i]t’s my body and I have the right to do as
I please with it” is usually defeated not by denying the existence or
validity of this right, but rather by illustrating that seemingly personal
behavior does in fact violate the harm principle and is therefore subject
to societal control.
Id. at 437 (footnote omitted).
149
See, e.g., id. at 433–34 (“Regulating public health risks with the goal of preventing
harm to others has proven to be the most politically compelling rationale for government
intervention.”). Pope articulates that the “ethical foundation” for regulation can be found
in the writings of John Stuart Mill:
Mill maintained that “the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized
community
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” That, he argued, is the
extent of the power we ceded when we entered into the social contract
forming the basis of human society.
Id. at 434 (footnote omitted).
150
See, e.g., Simon & Mosher, supra note 46, at 2 (discussing the need for energy drink
regulation, especially those that include alcohol).
151
See Brewington, supra note 53 and accompanying text (providing the slippery-slope
argument put forward by those opposed to greater energy drink regulation).
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health effects, energy drinks, like tobacco, may be on the path to
increased FDA regulation.152
B. A Caffeine Conundrum—The Link to Tobacco and the Need for Regulation
In order to determine the necessity of energy drink regulation, one
should take a step back and examine the drink’s most potent ingredient,
caffeine, one of the most widely used psychoactive drugs in the United
States and the world.153 Similar to the nicotine found in tobacco, the
physiological effects of caffeine vary from person to person; however,
once in the bloodstream, caffeine stimulates the heart and central
nervous system within thirty minutes to an hour.154 To that end,
periodic as well as habitual consumers of caffeine typically ingest the
drug to improve alertness, concentration, energy, focus, and even
feelings of sociability.155 Interestingly, the most noticeable physiological
152
See infra Part III.B (comparing the negative health consequences of tobacco use to
adverse therapeutic effects of energy drink consumption).
153
Jaffe, supra note 91, at 683; see also Pickworth, supra note 91, at 1066 (stating that
caffeine is “a psychoactive drug used by 80% of the population of the USA”) cited in
Prothro, supra note 91, at 66. Regarding the safety of caffeine ingestion, Gwendolyn
Prothro states that caffeine consumed in reasonable amounts “is a remedy as a stimulant
and a diuretic. But in large doses, it is a poison, an addictive substance injurious to human
health.
Moderation, therefore, should be the goal of consumers and the goal
communicated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).” Prothro, supra note 91, at 66.
Caffeine is an alkaloid, or nitrogen-containing substance, with the chemical formula
C8H10N4O2. Id. It belongs to the family of chemicals known as methylxanthines, which also
includes the closely related chemicals theophylline and theobromine. Id. According to
Prothro, caffeine in its purest form is
a white powder or a mass of glistening, white needles. It occurs
naturally in Cocoa, the Coffea arabica plant, the kola nut, and the
leaves of Thea sinensis. It can be created synthetically and by
extraction from cocoa, coffee bean or tea leaf waste. It is present in a
wide variety of prepared food and drugs: coffees, teas, soft drinks,
chocolates, and various pain relievers; thus it is ingested daily by
people across the world.
Id. at 66–67 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154
See Prothro, supra note 91, at 67 (explaining the definite effects of caffeine
consumption on the heart, intestines, muscles, and central nervous system).
155
Caffeine Myths and Facts, supra note 46. In addition, users of caffeine claim:
As a stimulant, it perks us up in the morning and generally restore[s]
mental alertness or wakefulness during [states of] fatigue or
drowsiness. It may improve semantic memory, logical reasoning,
recall and recognition memory, at least transiently. As an analgesic
adjuvant in aspirin and aspirin/acetaminophen combinations, it helps
to reduce pain. And as an ingredient in menstrual drug products, it is
effective in combating the fatigue and water weight gain associated
with menstrual and pre-menstrual periods.
Prothro, supra note 91, at 68–69 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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effects of tobacco are strikingly similar to those of energy drinks.156
These effects include “increased heart rate, increased release of
adrenaline, and a direct stimulatory effect on the brain, which combine
to produce the mild ‘rush’ cigarette smokers may experience when they
light up.”157 Some scientists and psychologists consider caffeine, like
nicotine, to be a poison that causes addiction and negative health effects
on the body.158 Comparable to the adverse health consequences of
tobacco use, studies conclude that chronic ingestion of caffeine can result
in stress, hypertension, decreased bone density, kidney stones, diabetes,
Equally detrimental, caffeine
hypoglycemia, and obesity.159
consumption may adversely affect pregnancy, and according to at least
one study, may nearly double the risk for miscarriage.160 The most
156
See supra note 46 (detailing the pharmacological effects of energy drink consumption);
supra note 81 (discussing the consequences of tobacco use).
157
EDLIN & GOLANTY, supra note 81, at 394.
158
See Prothro, supra note 91, at 72–73 (claiming that caffeine use is perhaps “[p]oison by
[a]ddiction”). According to an FDA ruling, caffeine consumption can lead to addiction, or
as the FDA defines it, a “habituation.” Drug Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use,
53 Fed. Reg. 6100, 6103 (Feb. 29, 1988) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 340).
159
SCHULTZ, supra note 92. A study by researchers at Duke University concluded that
there is a direct correlation between caffeine consumption and increased levels of stress in
the body. Id at 5. More specifically, James D. Lane, Ph.D., an associate research professor
at Duke and lead author of the study, stated that
[t]he effects of coffee drinking are long-lasting and exaggerate the
stress response both in terms of the body’s physiological response in
blood pressure elevations and stress hormone levels, but it also
magnifies a person’s perception of stress . . . . People haven’t really
accepted the fact that there could be a health downside to caffeine
consumption, but our evidence—and that of other studies—shows that
this downside exists and people should be aware of it in order to make
the best possible health choices.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). With regard to bone density, research has shown
there is an association between ingestion of caffeine and general skeletal weakness and
osteoporosis. Id. at 6. In a study lead by Prema B. Rapuri, published in the American
Journal of Clinical Nutrition, the researchers found that a higher rate of bone loss occurred
at the spine in postmenopausal women (ages 65–77) with caffeine intake greater than three
hundred milligrams per day. Rapuri, supra note 92, at 699. Another report published in
the Journal of Urology concluded that caffeine consumption increases the levels of calcium,
sodium, magnesium, and citrate—all of which increase the risk of developing kidney
stones. See Watch Your Caffeine Intake if You Are Prone to Kidney Stones, supra note 92.
Pertaining to diabetes, caffeine raises both the glucose and insulin levels of those affected
by type two diabetes. See SCHULTZ, supra note 92, at 12 (explaining that continuous caffeine
consumption can cause adult onset diabetes due to increased weight gain). In addition, a
Duke University medical study deduced that caffeine consumption by people with
established type two diabetes experienced a significant increase of glucose levels following
ingestion of the caffeine. Lane, supra note 92.
160
Grady, supra note 92. This study, published in The American Journal of Obstetrics
and Gynecology, found “that pregnant women who consume 200 milligrams or more of
caffeine a day—the amount in 10 ounces of coffee or 25 ounces of tea—may double their
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common effect of habitual caffeine consumption, however, is physical
and psychological dependence evidenced by a user’s tolerance and
withdrawal.161 For instance, studies in adult twins reveal that “caffeine
toxicity and caffeine dependence are significantly and positively
associated with various psychiatric disorders including major
depression, generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, antisocial
personality disorder, alcohol dependence, and cannabis and cocaine
abuse/dependence.”162 Collectively, these scientific results reinforce the
pro-regulation arguments which provide that because energy drink
consumption affirmatively causes many of the same negative
physiological and pharmacological effects as nicotine, such beverages
should be regulated in a fashion similar to the regulation of tobacco.163
In contrast, those who reject the argument that drugs with similar
physiological and pharmacological effects should be regulated similarly
generally emphasize that although the results of caffeine ingestion are
transitory, its stimulatory and diuretic properties can benefit your

risk of miscarriage. Pregnant women should try to give up caffeine for at least the first
three or four months,” according to the lead author of the study, Dr. De-Kun Li, a
reproductive and perinatal epidemiologist at the Kaiser Permanente Division of Research
in Oakland, California. Id.
161
Prothro, supra note 91, at 72–73 (“[C]affeine exhibits the features of a typical
psychoactive substance of dependence.”) (quoting Eric C. Strain et al., Caffeine Dependence
Syndrome: Evidence from Case Histories and Experimental Evaluations, 272 J.A.M.A. 1043
(1994)). Dependence, the most common effect of continual ingestion of caffeine, manifests
itself through at least three of these four symptoms: tolerance, withdrawal, persistent
desire, or unsuccessful attempts to reduce consumption. Id. “The [Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders] defines substance dependence using a generic set
of cognitive, physiological, and behavioral symptoms, including the inability to quit, use
despite harm, using more than intended, withdrawal, and tolerance.” Reissig, supra note
52, at 5. Interestingly, the DSM-IV-TR does not categorize caffeine as a substance that can
cause dependence; in fact, it “specifically excludes” it from its diagnostic schema. Id. The
World Health Organization, on the other hand, considers caffeine as a substance that can
cause dependence. Id. Most experts agree that withdrawal is the most common symptom
related to caffeine reliance. See Prothro, supra note 91, at 73 (footnote omitted)
(“Withdrawal . . . can occur after ceasing the consumption of as little as two cups of coffee a
day (roughly 250 milligrams), within eighteen to twenty-four hours after the last caffeine
intake.”). According to a medical review led by Chad J. Reissig, “[i]n addition to headache,
other caffeine withdrawal symptoms include tiredness/fatigue, sleepiness/drowsiness,
dysphoric mood (e.g., miserable, decreased well-being/contentedness), difficulty
concentrating/decreased cognitive performance, depression, irritability, nausea/vomiting,
and muscle aches/stiffness.” Reissig, supra note 52, at 5.
162
Reissig, supra note 52, at 6. Relating to the relationship of cigarettes and caffeine,
Reissig writes that “human and animal studies show that caffeine increases the reinforcing
effects of nicotine. Epidemiology studies show that cigarette smokers consume more
caffeine than nonsmokers, an effect that may be partially due to increased caffeine
metabolism among cigarette smokers.” Id. (citations omitted).
163
See id. (discussing the relationship of caffeine to dependence on tobacco).
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health.164 Further, opponents to regulation argue that caffeine stimulates
brain function and may even enhance athletic performance.165 Critics of
the purported caffeine and nicotine comparison might also argue that
even if many of the physiological effects are the same, energy drinks
should not be regulated like tobacco because, frankly, caffeine is far less
lethal.166 Further, those critics might assert that the majority of tobacco
studies conclude that the “death rate from cancer, heart disease, and
respiratory diseases [are] higher among cigarette smokers than among
nonsmokers,” and the same cannot be said for consumers and nonconsumers of energy drinks.167
Both sides of the energy drink regulation debate form persuasive
arguments and rely on credible scientific evidence, but the public health
concern remains.168 Although caffeine dependence does not present as
grave a problem as alcohol and nicotine addiction and does not cause
nearly as many deaths, caffeine dependence is not trivial—caffeine is one
of the most widely used drugs in the United States, and it causes
numerous harmful health consequences each year.169
Scientific
investigation establishes that alcohol, tobacco, and caffeine interconnect,
See Prothro, supra note 91, at 68 (explaining why there is a caffeine conundrum).
See CLARK, supra note 95, at 178–79 (explaining the effects of caffeine with regard to
exercise). “The vast majority of the studies conclude that caffeine does indeed enhance
performance (by about 11 percent) and makes the effort seem easier (by about 6 percent).
Endurance athletes notice more benefits than those who do shorter bouts of exercise.” Id.
(citation omitted).
166
See supra note 46 (detailing the therapeutic effects of energy drink consumption);
RABINOFF, supra note 5, at 11 (discussing the lethalness of tobacco and its effect on
Americans). Sadly, “[e]very single day, more than a thousand Americans—in excess of 8,000
a week or more than 35,000 a month—are killed by the effects of smoking. Its cost in
dollars and human lives staggers the imagination.” Id. at 11.
167
EDLIN & GOLANTY, supra note 81, at 396. Edlin and Golanty state that “smoking
decreases a person’s life expectancy by an average of seven years. Smokers between the
ages of 35 and 70 have death rates three times higher than those who have never smoked.”
Id.
168
See infra Part IV (proposing amendments to the FDCA with the aim of protecting the
public health and safety from harmful effects of energy drinks).
169
Prothro, supra note 91, at 73–74. Restating conclusions of multiple studies regarding
the relationship of caffeine to dependence on other substances, Chad Reissig articulates the
following:
[a] study examining the co-occurrence of substance use among drug
abusers concluded that dependence on caffeine, nicotine and alcohol
were governed by the same factors. . . . More specifically, with regard
to cigarette smoking, human and animal studies show that caffeine
increases the reinforcing effects of nicotine. Epidemiology studies
show that cigarette smokers consume more caffeine than nonsmokers,
an effect that may be partially due to increased caffeine metabolism
among cigarette smokers.
Reissig, supra note 52, at 10 (citations omitted).
164
165
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and this correlation fuels the dispute regarding more extensive
regulation of caffeine.170 But, before any form of increased regulation is
promulgated, the FDA must first determine whether it possesses
jurisdiction to direct a new legislative policy.171
C. The FDA’s Newly Acquired Jurisdiction of Tobacco—Is It Operative for
Energy Drinks?
Now that the FSPTCA has officially been enacted, the FDA possesses
broad authority to regulate the manufacturing, marketing, and
distribution of tobacco products.172 The DSHEA, in contrast, is an
ambiguous and skeletal statute that may actually encourage
manufacturers to characterize their product as a dietary supplement in
order to circumvent regulatory red tape.173 Because the DSHEA does not
expressly provide the FDA with the power to regulate heavily
caffeinated beverages, some suggest the FDA could interpret the scope of
the statute more broadly as it did with tobacco in the past.174 Such a
course of action, however, could prove unsuccessful; perhaps the best
solution for Congress is either to amend the FDCA or to pass a new
statute expressly affording the FDA regulatory power over energy
drinks similar to the power it now exercises over tobacco.175
To ascertain whether the FDA has jurisdiction to regulate energy
drinks in both pre- and post-market divisions, a comparison to the
170
See generally Reissig, supra note 52, at 10 (describing the association between caffeine,
alcohol, and tobacco usage). Some scientists and psychologists claim that caffeine acts as a
gateway to other types of drug dependence and causes reckless behavior. Id. “In one
study published by the American College of Health in March, [2008], students who drank
at least six energy drinks per month were three times as likely to have smoked cigarettes,
abused prescription drugs and been involved in fights.” Warlick, supra note 94, at 2E.
Further, researchers from Wake Forest University School of Medicine found that
[s]tudents who consumed alcohol mixed with energy drinks were
twice as likely to be hurt or injured, twice as likely to require medical
attention, and twice as likely to ride with an intoxicated driver, as were
students who did not consume alcohol mixed with energy drinks.
Students who drank alcohol mixed with energy drinks were more than
twice as likely to take advantage of someone else sexually, and almost
twice as likely to be taken advantage of sexually.
Public Health; Study Shows Energy Drink “Cocktails” Lead to Increased Injury Risk, supra note
94, at 74.
171
See infra Part III.C (applying principles of tobacco regulation to dietary supplements).
172
See supra note 69 (discussing the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
and the FDA’s authority promulgated by the statute).
173
See Onel, supra note 56, at 341 (providing an overview of the DSHEA).
174
Cf. id. at 348 (stating that companies exploit the legal ambiguities of the DSHEA to
gain a stronghold in the market).
175
See infra Part IV (proposing a modified version of the DSHEA that will provide the
FDA with authority to regulate dietary supplements on a level similar to tobacco).
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FDA’s attempt to regulate tobacco pre-FSPTCA is instructive.176 For
example, “[a]lmost invariably, when courts (and academics) grapple
with whether an agency’s views on the extent of its own powers should
merit Chevron deference, they refer to such issues, without
Essentially, there are three
differentiation, as ‘jurisdictional.’”177
situations pertaining to an agency’s jurisdictional interpretation:
expansion or contraction of agency authority; fabrication or
transformation of power; and alteration of regulatory scope.178 A
noteworthy case involving the FDA’s scope of authority is FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., in which the Court held that Congress did
not intend to allow the FDA to regulate tobacco under the FDCA.179
Congress effectively superseded the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
decision by passing the FSPTCA, which ultimately could open the door
for the FDA to extend the FDCA’s statutory scope and regulate other
addictive products such as energy drinks.180
D. Is the FDA Re-emerging from the Depths of Congressional Neglect?
Critics of more expansive FDA regulatory authority commonly claim
that the FDA is overburdened, underfunded, and understaffed.181 This
Cf. Sales & Adler, supra note 67, at 1513–15 (providing case law that challenged the
FDA’s scope of authority under the FDCA).
177
Id. at 1502. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in the landmark decision of
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., articulated the following:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
178
See Sales & Adler, supra note 67, at 1503–06 (providing a categorization of agency
jurisdictional interpretation).
179
529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000). In her majority opinion, Justice O’Connor stated that
“although agencies are generally entitled to deference in the interpretation of statutes that
they administer, a reviewing ‘court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’” Id. at 125–26 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at
842–43) (footnote omitted).
180
Conway, supra note 67.
181
See Abdullah, supra note 77 (providing statements from various senators who believe
the FDA lacks the resources to direct and enforce the FSPTCA).
176
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repetitious criticism was evident during floor debates concerning the
FSPTCA and the questioning that followed.182 Most notably, Senator
Saxby Chambliss of Georgia made the following assertion:
I voted against the FDA tobacco bill because I’m
opposed to the overregulation of an industry that’s
already
highly
regulated,
from
farmer
to
manufacturer . . . .
The bill saddles the already
overburdened FDA with even more oversight duties,
and does nothing to reduce the rate of smoking among
Americans—cigarettes already on the shelves will
remain on the market.183

182
Id. Abdullah writes that Minority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, Senator
Richard Burr of North Carolina, Senator Saxby Chambliss of Georgia, and Senator Jim
Bunning of Kentucky “[a]ll oppose giving additional tobacco regulatory powers to the
FDA, an agency they argue doesn’t have adequate resources for the task.” Id. Senator
McConnell argues that “[m]andating the FDA to regulate and approve the use of tobacco
would be a distortion of the agency’s mission and a tremendous misuse of its overstretched
priorities . . . . We should focus FDA resources on protecting the public health, not
burdening it with an impossible assignment.” Id. In his opening remarks of the floor
debate, Representative Henry Waxman articulated that
[s]ome have objected that this bill is too big a challenge for an already
overburdened FDA. But it is clear to me that FDA’s recent struggles
are primarily a result of years of chronic underfunding. . . . [W]hen we
give the agency this new responsibility, we also must give it the
resources necessary to do the job and to do it well.
155 CONG. REC. H4338–39 (Apr. 1, 2009) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
183
Abdullah, supra note 77. Some speculate that the senators from Kentucky, North
Carolina, and Georgia voted against the FSPTCA to protect the Big Tobacco companies
located in their respective states. See id. (“[Those senators] say cigarette companies’
campaign contributions didn’t color their positions on the legislation.”). Concerning
campaign contributions, it is interesting to note:
Over the course of his nearly quarter-century Senate career, Minority
Leader Mitch McConnell, who hails from the tobacco-rich state of
Kentucky, has received $419,025 from the tobacco industry, more than
any other member of Congress, according to the Center for Responsive
Politics, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that analyzes the
influence of money on politics and policy. North Carolina Republican
Sen. Richard Burr, who led the opposition to the bill, is the second
highest recipient and netted $359,100 from tobacco-related political
action committees and individual contributions. His state is the
nation’s largest tobacco grower and is home to R.J. Reynolds, the
nation’s second largest tobacco manufacturing company, which
contributed $196,850 to Burr’s campaigns. Georgia Sen. Saxby
Chambliss, the ranking Republican on the Senate Agriculture
Committee, is the third highest recipient with $228,700. Kentucky Sen.
Jim Bunning, who’s up for re-election next year and is considered the
most vulnerable Senate Republican, ranks eighth with $194,166.
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Conversely, a user fee funds the FSPTCA, which will generate $4.5
billion over nine years by requiring tobacco companies to directly
transfer a percentage of revenue to the FDA.184 Because of this user fee,
lack of funding is likely not a problem for the FDA to effectively
regulate; therefore, the argument that the FDA is overburdened and
understaffed may be more persuasive.185
As evidence to support the notion that the FDA may be
understaffed, it currently employs only 11,000 scientific, technical, and
professional staff to carry out its mission of protecting the health and
safety of more than 300 million Americans.186 Over the years, Congress
has simultaneously expanded the size and power of the FDA, while
encumbering it with an increasingly broad and arduous task.187 Peter
Id. (citing statistics from the Center for Responsive Politics).
184
See 155 CONG. REC. H4339 (Apr. 1, 2009) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (“The tobacco
program will be fully funded through a new user fee paid for by the industry.”). User fee
taxes are also referred to as “sin taxes,” which are taxes of immediate-gratification goods.
See Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 51, at 734 (providing examples of sin taxes). According to
the FDA, “[t]he User Fee program allows FDA to fulfill its mission of protecting the public
health and accelerating innovation in the industry. . . . The Division of User Fees is
responsible for the overall management of the program . . . and [it] maintains an accounts
receivable system used for user fee invoicing and collections.” FDA, USER FEES, supra note
79. More specifically, “[t]he Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act User Fee
program will generate over $4.5 [billion] in user fees over nine years (2009–2018).” FDA,
TOBACCO PRODUCT FEES, supra note 79.
185
See FDA, FISCAL YEAR 2010 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
INTRODUCTION AND MISSION, supra note 78, at 2 (providing an overview of the 2010
proposed budget for the FDA). The Commissioner of the FDA, Margaret A. Hamburg,
summarizes the 2010 budget changes as follows:
The fiscal year (FY) 2010 President’s Budget request for FDA is
$3,178,369,000. This represents a total program level increase of
$510,554,000 above the amount enacted into law for FY 2009. The total
program level request includes new budget authority, current law user
fees, and new proposed user fees. The FY 2010 increase for user fees is
$215,359,000, including $141,000,000 in proposed new user fees. The
FY 2010 increase in budget authority is $295,195,000, of which
$29,536,000 is for the cost of living pay increase.
Id.
186
Id. The Executive Summary further states that the “FDA affects the lives of every
American every day. Each year, consumers spend nearly $1.5 trillion on FDA-regulated
products. This represents twenty percent of all consumer expenditures.” Id.
187
Id. Succinctly, the FDA responsible for
protecting the public health by assuring the safety of America’s foods,
the safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs,
biological products and medical devices, and the safety and security of
cosmetics and products that emit radiation. FDA is also responsible
for advancing the public health by helping to speed innovations that
make medicines safer and more effective. FDA also provides the
public with accurate, science-based information about medicines and
foods to improve their health.
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Barton Hutt, former FDA chief counsel, contends that this situation is a
“paradigmatic example of the ‘hollow government’ syndrome—an
agency with expanded responsibilities, stagnant resources, and the
consequent inability to implement or enforce its statutory mandates.”188
This syndrome drives the bureaucratic, anti-regulatory contention that
the FDA is not capable of effectively regulating yet another large
industry—the energy drink industry.189
A branch of the FDA, the Center for Food Safety and Applied
Nutrition (“CFSAN”) headquartered in College Park, Maryland,
currently regulates energy drinks as dietary supplements.190 In the past,
Congress has expected the CFSAN to implement multiple complex
statutes while receiving less funding each fiscal year and a reduced
Id. See generally Hutt, The State of Science, supra note 45, at 434–36 (providing a history of the
FDA and the products it regulates).
188
Hutt, The State of Science, supra note 45, at 432. Hutt further discusses the troubles the
FDA is facing by stating the following:
In terms of both personnel and the money to support them, the agency
is barely hanging on by its fingertips. The accumulating unfunded
statutory responsibilities imposed on the FDA, the extraordinary
advance of scientific discoveries, the complexity of the new products
and claims submitted to the FDA for premarket review and approval,
the emergence of challenging safety problems, and the globalization of
the industries that the FDA regulates—coupled with chronic
underfunding by Congress—have conspired to place demands upon
the scientific base of the agency that far exceed its capacity to respond.
Id.
189
Cf. 155 CONG. REC. H4341 (Apr. 1, 2009) (statement of Rep. Buyer) (claiming that the
FDA does not have the resources necessary to more comprehensively regulate the tobacco
industry). In a floor debate regarding the FSPTCA, Representative Steve Buyer of Indiana
stated that
Congress has spent a great deal of time investigating the ways in
which the FDA has been unable to fulfill its core mission. Burdening
the FDA with additional responsibilities outside the agency’s expertise
and core missions at this time will have dire consequences for the
American people and the FDA’s ability to ensure the safety and
efficacy of our Nation’s food, drugs and medical devices. . . . At a time
when FDA is struggling to perform many of its core functions,
diversion of its limited resources will negatively impact the safety of
the American public.
Id.
190
See Hutt, The State of Science, supra note 45, at 459–60 (discussing the disintegrating
state of the CFSAN due to insufficient funding and personnel). On its website, the FDA
emphasizes that “[t]he Center has over 800 employees, who range from secretaries and
other support staff to highly specialized professionals—such as chemists, microbiologists,
toxicologists, food technologists, pathologists, molecular biologists, pharmacologists,
nutritionists, epidemiologists, mathematicians, sanitarians, physicians and veterinarians.”
About the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, supra note 43. The CFSAN ensures
that the “nation’s food supply is safe, sanitary, wholesome, and honestly labeled, and that
cosmetic products are safe and properly labeled.” CFSAN—What We Do, supra note 43.
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allotment of full-time equivalent employees.191 More recently however,
in the fiscal years of 2008 and 2009, the CFSAN employed 753 and 854
workers, respectively.192 To help address this understaffing issue,
Congress is planning to increase the employment allotment for the
CFSAN to an estimated 947 skilled positions in the fiscal year 2010.193 In
the 2008 and 2009 CFSAN budget for salaries and expenses, Congress
authorized $576,659,000 and $648,722,000, respectively.194 For fiscal year
2010, the FDA requested $782,915,000, which also tends to indicate that
the CFSAN is gaining strength.195 Consequently, it appears that the
FDA, and more specifically, the CFSAN, is on the rebound pertaining to
funding and employment figures.196 Although critics of increased FDA
regulatory power contend the FDA is already overburdened,
underfunded, and understaffed, in actuality, the FDA seems to be
reemerging from the depths of congressional neglect and setting sail on
the proper course to protect and promote healthy lifestyles.197
Although there is fervent disagreement regarding the therapeutic
effects of caffeine, the necessity of regulation, and the amount of FDA
resources, it is not necessarily a negative atmosphere.198 Rather, as
See Hutt, The State of Science, supra note 45, at 459–61 (detailing concerns regarding the
viability of the food safety program in the CFSAN). According to Hutt, “[i]n the fifteen
years from 1992 to 2007, CFSAN suffered a reduction in force of 138 people, from 950 to
812, or fifteen percent of its staff.” Id. at 459. Although the CFSAN suffered enormous
losses in funding and personnel, Congress
expected [the CFSAN] to implement such complex statutes as the
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, the Dietary Supplement
Health and Education Act of 1994, the FDA Modernization Act of 1997,
the Food Safety and Security Amendments of 2002, the Food Allergen
Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, and the Sanitary Food
Transportation Act of 2005, and most recently the Dietary Supplement
Adverse Event Reporting Act of 2006 and the Food Safety
Amendments of 2007—to name just the most important unfunded
food statutes enacted during this period—while facing a loss of 138
people.
Id.
192
FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, DETAIL OF FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT (FTE)
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM LEVEL, supra note 43, at 265.
193
Id.
194
FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FY 2010 ALL PURPOSE TABLE—BUDGET AUTHORITY,
supra note 43.
195
Id.
196
See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text (providing the fiscal budgets for 2008,
2009, and estimated budget for 2010).
197
See infra Part IV (proposing a plan to increase FDA funding and personnel so the
agency may more effectively regulate the energy drink industry).
198
See supra Part III.A (providing a comparison of the various forms of regulation); supra
Part III.B (comparing the therapeutic effects of caffeine to tobacco); supra Part III.D
(analyzing the scarcity of resources argument regarding the FDA’s ability to regulate).
191
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Mahatma Gandhi wisely articulated, “[h]onest disagreement is often a
good sign of progress.”199 Progress in energy drink regulation could
come by means of a congressional act to amend the FDCA that increases
funding and employee allotment for the CFSAN, as well as modifies the
language of the FDCA to permit increased regulation of dietary
supplements and an implementation of an energy drink user fee
program to raise capital.200
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE FDCA
A practical and efficient solution to the energy drink regulation
conundrum is for Congress to pass legislation amending the FDCA and
expressly afford the FDA regulatory power over energy drinks similar to
that which it now exercises over tobacco. If Congress amends the FDCA
allowing the FDA to implement certain protective measures, the FDA
will effectively avoid jurisdictional obstacles.201 The FSPTCA resolved
ambiguity regarding tobacco regulation, and an amendment of the
FDCA can do the same.202 The following subsections provide a proposed
statutory definition, a FSPTCA provision applicable to energy drink
regulation, suggested directives for implementation, and recommended
warning label requirements for energy drinks.203
A. Proposed Statutory Definition of an Energy Drink
Congress should amend the FDCA (21 U.S.C. § 321) by inserting a
provision following section 321(ff)(2) that explicitly defines an energy
drink as “a heavily-caffeinated liquid substance for use by man to supplement
the diet.”204 This provision will remove ambiguity as to whether an
energy drink is classified as a conventional food product or a dietary
supplement.205 Proposed subsection (ss), following section 321(rr), will

JOHNSON, supra note 108, at 117.
See infra Part IV (proposing a modification of the FDCA that would afford the FDA the
requisite authority and capital to regulate energy drinks).
201
See supra Part III.C (explaining FDA jurisdictional issues).
202
The following proposals are the author’s contributions. Specifically, proposed
additions are italicized, and existing statutory language is left unchanged. The author’s
commentary and suggestion for implementation follows each proposed FDCA
amendment.
203
See infra Part IV (providing amendments to the FDCA and directives for FDA
regulation of energy drinks).
204
See 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff) (2006) (defining dietary supplement).
205
See supra text accompanying notes 54–61 (explaining the statutory overlap regarding
dietary supplement and conventional food products).
199
200
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define the phrase “heavily caffeinated liquid substance.”206 Proposed
subsection (ss) provides the following:
(ss) The term “heavily caffeinated liquid substance” means
any fluid liquid beverage containing:
(1) a quantity of caffeine in excess of eighty (80)
milligrams per eight (8) ounces; or
(2) one or more of the following ingredients constituting
an “energy blend”:
(A) Carnitine;
(B) Glucuronolactone;
(C) Glucose;
(D) Guarana;
(E) Inositol;
(F) Maltodextrin;
(G) Panax Ginseng;
(H) Super Citramax (Hydroxy Citric Acid, Garcinia
Cambogia Extract);
(I) Taurine; or,
(J) Yohimbine HCL.
Eighty milligrams caffeine per eight ounces is generally the
minimum threshold amount of caffeine that energy drink manufacturers
include in their beverages.207 In addition, energy drinks contain “energy
blends” commonly concocted of the above-listed ingredients.208 Thus,
this proposed subsection categorizes a heavily caffeinated beverage as an
energy drink according to its ingredients, rather than the manufacturer’s
marketing claims.209
B. Application of FSPTCA Provisions to Energy Drink Regulation
Next, Congress should amend the FDCA and afford the FDA the
authority to regulate heavily caffeinated beverages in a way similar to
how it regulates tobacco. In the first line of the FSPTCA regarding the
purpose of the statute, Congress unequivocally granted the FDA power
to regulate the manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of tobacco
206
See supra note 46 (listing common energy drink ingredients and discussing the
advertised and actual pharmacological effects of each ingredient).
207
See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing typical caffeine content of energy
drinks).
208
See supra note 46 (listing common energy drink ingredients contained in “energy
blends”).
209
See supra notes 54–61 (explaining why the DSHEA permits manufacturers to
categorize its product as a dietary supplement solely based on marketing claims).
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products—a power that can be operative in regulating energy drinks as
well.210 In section 342(f)(1) of the FDCA, Congress should include a new
subsection (E), which grants the FDA the requisite authority to regulate
energy drinks.211 The proposed amendment to section 342(f)(1) is as
follows:
(f) Dietary supplement or ingredient: safety.
(1) If it is a dietary supplement or contains a dietary
ingredient that—
....
(E) presents a genuine risk of illness or injury
proximately resulting from ingestion of a heavily
caffeinated liquid substance (as defined by 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(ss)), the Secretary shall have discretion to regulate
the manufacturing, marketing, and distribution in the
least restrictive manner appropriate to protect the public
health.
To begin, proposed subsection (E) provides that the FDA will retain
the initial burden of proof. In order to regulate an energy drink, the FDA
(or more specifically, the CFSAN) must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that one or more of the ingredients in the energy drink presents
a “genuine risk of illness or injury.”212 This standard is not as onerous as
the “significant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury” standard stated
in subsection (A), but it still requires the FDA to show that one or more
of the ingredients contained in a given energy drink should be regulated
to protect the public health.213 This requirement benefits manufacturers
because the FDA cannot issue blanket regulations for the entire industry.
Instead, the FDA must evaluate the ingredients of each individual
product with regard to safety. More specifically, the CFSAN must show,

210
See supra Part III.C (providing an analysis whether certain provisions of the FSPTCA
are applicable to energy drink regulation). See generally supra Part II.C (discussing the
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009). In addition to amending
the FDCA, Congress should pass a directive, which implements an energy drink user-fee
program to help fund the FDA’s regulatory efforts.
211
See 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1) (2006) (defining safety requirements for dietary supplements).
212
See e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“genuine” as “(Of a thing) authentic or real; having the quality of what a given thing
purports to be or to have.” Id. Comparatively speaking, the “genuine risk” standard is less
burdensome to prove than the “significant or unreasonable risk” standard stated in
subsection (A) but is a greater standard to surpass than, for instance, a legitimate or
justifiable risk.
213
Id.
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through empirical evidence, that one or more of the ingredients included
in the energy drink yields a genuine risk of illness or injury.214
Next, the second clause of proposed subsection (E) grants the
Secretary of the FDA authority to regulate the manufacturing,
marketing, and distribution of energy drinks as he or she deems
necessary. This authority is constrained, however, by the third clause
that allows the Secretary to implement regulations as needed to protect
the public health, but only in a minimally intrusive manner. The third
clause will help prevent an FDA Secretary from exceeding his or her
grant of authority, thus hopefully averting a potential Chevron-type
conflict.215
C. Suggested Directives for Implementation and Enforcement
Proposed subsection (E) provides the FDA with the power to
regulate the manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of energy
drinks; however, what does that entail?216 Although listed first in the
proposed statute, the Secretary may only use the authority to regulate
manufacturing as a last resort where an impending, perilous risk to the
public is present. If the situation requires, the Secretary may compel the
manufacturer to remove the energy drink from the market and modify
its ingredients. Once the manufacturer makes the required changes, it
must file for re-approval.
When the CFSAN determines that a certain energy drink poses a
genuine risk of illness or injury to the populace, the Secretary should
initially focus his or her efforts on issues associated with energy drink
marketing. For example, a straightforward and effective regulatory
strategy would require conspicuous warning labels on the cans,
packaging, and advertisements.217 For years, the FDA required tobacco
companies to print, in rotation, various Surgeon General Warnings to
inform tobacco users of the risks involved with tobacco use.218 The FDA
should implement a similar requirement for energy drinks because it is
simple to institute and does not increase manufacturing costs.
Id.
See generally supra note 177 (discussing the Chevron analysis courts apply when faced
with a question whether a governmental agency exceeded its grant of authority).
216
The subsequent implementation suggestions and guidelines are of the author’s
opinion.
217
See supra note 74 and accompanying text. According to the FSPTCA, tobacco
manufacturers will be required as of June 22, 2011, to print text and graphic warning labels
covering fifty percent of the front and rear panels of the package. See Effective Dates of New
FDA Tobacco Law Provisions, supra note 74 (discussing FSPTCA implementation guidelines).
218
See supra note 73 (listing common Surgeon General’s Warnings displayed on tobacco
packaging).
214
215
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D. Recommended Warning Label Requirements
Similar to tobacco labeling standards, the FDA should require
energy drink manufacturers to display, in a contrasting color, various
bold-font warnings determined by the FDA.219 Further, the FDA should
require manufacturers to display the warning above the brand label and
rotate the warning statements on a quarterly basis. For instance, the
warnings could state the caffeine content in milligrams and give a
proportional comparison to a standard unit, such as a single cup of
coffee (e.g., “This beverage contains the equivalent amount of caffeine in 2.5
cups of coffee.”). In addition, cautionary statements should be displayed
on a rotating basis stating the following:
“Do not consume this beverage if you are pregnant or
nursing, or less than 13 years of age”;
“This beverage may cause nervousness, irritability,
sleeplessness, and occasional rapid heartbeat”;
“Do not consume this beverage if you experience chest pains”;
and
“This beverage may cause caffeine intoxication and lead to
addiction.”
Finally, proposed subsection (E), pursuant to CFSAN findings and
the Secretary’s judgment, permits the FDA to regulate the distribution of
energy drinks. This power should not be employed for punitive
measures but rather used for protective purposes. For instance, the FDA
could restrict the sale and supply of energy drinks in public elementary
and middle schools. Several schools nationwide already ban the sale and
supply of energy drinks; thus, this restriction is merely an extension of
locally enforced policy. In closing, the former propositions serve as a
plan to achieve a theoretical objective. In order for this regulatory
scheme to develop and flourish, Congress must amend the FDCA,
thereby affording the FDA greater regulatory authority analogous to the
recently enacted FSPTCA.
V. CONCLUSION
As time passes and new generations are born, government policy
evolves. In the United States’ representative democracy, sometimes
elected officials speak for the majority of their constituents and
sometimes for themselves. Further, the scope of government regulation
219
See supra note 74 (discussing the broad authority Congress granted the FDA by
passing the FSPTCA).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 [2011], Art. 7

740

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

is perpetually debated, and political majorities generally control the
argument. However, one tenet that elected officials typically share is the
dedication to protect the public’s health and safety.
Legislators commonly rely on scientific evidence when determining
whether to regulate a product. In the case of energy drinks, results of
scientific studies conflict, but the safety concern remains. Congress
retains the power to amend the FDCA and insert provisions that enable
the FDA to regulate heavily caffeinated beverages. Regardless of the
political party in power, Congress often responds too late after the harm
occurs. Perhaps preemptive regulation is imprudent, but it is worth an
attempt. Therefore, an amendment of the FDCA granting the FDA
authority to regulate energy drinks would be a step in the right
direction.
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